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I Articles I
Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult Criminal
Court: A Conflict of Interests Violation
Amounting to the States' Legislative




The nation watched in awe as Florida courts convicted fourteen-
year-old Lionel Tate and later, sixteen-year-old Nathan Brazill for first
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and second degree murder, respectively.1  In both instances, these
"youth" were not treated as such by our criminal justice system. Instead,
the Florida legislature, through their prosecutorial waiver scheme,2 tied
the hands of the juvenile court by effectively requiring that the
adjudication of Tate and Brazill occur in the adult criminal court. In the
eyes of our nation, the ages of the offenders were viewed equally as
tragic as perhaps the victims' deaths.
Nevertheless, we must consider closely any state legislative scheme
that, on one hand, promotes the protective role of the state over juveniles
under the doctrine of parens patriae,3 but on the other hand, constructs a
system whereby the very same state officer (the prosecutor) who
performs this role also decides, by his own sagacity, that the juvenile
should be tried as an adult.4  In our criminal justice system, 5 if the
1. Lionel Tate was convicted for the first degree murder of six year old Tiffany
Eunick in 1999. The Florida Circuit Court in Broward County sentenced Tate to a
mandatory life in prison. Tate was 12 at the time he committed the murder. Tate v.
State, 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Similarly, Nathan Brazill was convicted
for the second degree murder and aggravated assault of his middle school teacher, Barry
Grunow, in 2000. The Florida Circuit Court in Palm Beach County sentenced Brazill to
prison for 28 years for murder and 5 years for assault. Brazill v. State, 845 So. 2d 282
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
2. The Florida prosecutor sought indictment by a grand jury for Tate and Brazill on
the first and second degree murder charges under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.225 (West
2003). Florida represents one of a minority of jurisdictions that utilize the prosecutorial
waiver method of transfer. The statute in question provides, "a child of any age who is
charged with a violation of state law punishable by death of life imprisonment is subject
to the jurisdiction of the (juvenile) court ... unless and until an indictment on the charge
is returned by the grand jury. When such indictment is returned, the petition for
delinquency, if any, must be dismissed and the child must be tried and handled in every
respect as an adult .... " FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.225 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
3. See textual discussion on the history and operation of this doctrine infra Part II.
4. See Brenda Gordon, A Criminal's Justice or a Child's Injustice? Trends in the
Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and the Flaws in the Arizona Response, 41 ARMz. L.
REV. 193, 204-08 (1999); see also, Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis The Menace Or Billy The
Kid: An Analysis Of The Role Of Transfer To Criminal Court In Juvenile Justice, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 371, 397 (1998). Through enactment of legislation, the states' utilize
various methods for transferring juveniles into adult criminal court. These methods
include judicial, legislative exclusion, and prosecutorial waiver (a type of legislative
waiver). In judicial waiver jurisdiction, the juvenile judge decides whether to transfer to
criminal court by considering the individual child's amenability for rehabilitation. Even
in some judicial waiver jurisdictions, the prosecutor may be involved by initiating a
motion to the juvenile court judge to transfer the child. However, after the request is
made, the juvenile or the criminal court judge will assess the child's case and decide
whether to transfer. See MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712a.4 (West 1996); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 62B.390 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506 (1991). In legislative
exclusion, the state will exclude certain offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction and
place exclusive jurisdiction over a child in the criminal court based on age at the time the
offense was committed and alleged enumerated offenses. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28
(2002). For prosecutorial waiver, the state may include certain offenses within the
prosecutor's discretionary power to file in adult court. In other forms, the prosecutor is
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prosecutor is the state, then as the state, he also serves as parens patriae
in our juvenile justice system.6  Therein lies an inherent conflict that
violates basic principles of due process that are afforded any criminal
defendant, much less juvenile defendants.7
Generally, our legal system classifies individuals into separate
groups based on their age by granting adults and youth different rights
and privileges . In fact, the United States Supreme Court recently noted
in Roper v. Simmons 9 that, "[t]he age of 18 is the point where society
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood."' °
For example, we allow our youth to defend this country through
participation in the Armed Forces,11 and yet, we require our men to
mandated to file based on the nature of the offense and the age of the child. In both
mandatory and discretionary prosecutorial waiver, the state legislation grants concurrent
jurisdiction between the juvenile and criminal courts. This article, however, will
specifically focus on the prosecutorial waiver methodology reflected in the language of
certain jurisdictions where the prosecutor is empowered with the sole discretion to file
charges against juveniles directly into adult criminal court absent any judicial
consideration of the child's amenability to rehabilitation. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
318(c) (Michie 2004); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(d) (West 2004); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-2-517(2) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 985.226-27 (West 2005); LA. CIVIL
CODE ANN. art. 305(B)(3) & 305(B)(3)(4) (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-274
(Michie 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-203(t) (Michie 2003).
5. R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 2 (Thomson West 2005). The
author describes the prosecutor's role as representing the "collective sovereign" which
includes the county, state or federal government.
6. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,554-55 (1966) (discussing the philosophy
under which the juvenile court was founded and also ruled that juveniles were entitled to
constitutional rights enjoyed by adults in the criminal court system; thereby requiring that
transfer hearings satisfy due process and fair treatment standards); see discussion infra in
Part V.A.
7. The determinative standard to satisfy due process is fundamental fairness.
Charles F. Scott, Delinquency and Due Process: A Review of Illinois Law, 59 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 123, 130 (1982) (quoting People v. Cater, 398 N.E.2d 28, 32 (I11. App. Ct. 1979).
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the Due Process clause
requires application during the adjudicatory stage to ensure the essentials of due process
and fair treatment. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the
constitutional safeguard of beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required during the
adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding as other constitutional safeguards such as
right to counsel, rights of confrontation and examination and the privilege against self-
incrimination).
8. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 215 (quoting Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin
Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 323, 361 (1991)) where the author states, "To a
large degree, 'the cut-off between adolescence and adulthood is arbitrary,' with the
dividing line, in part, a social and legal construct."
9. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
10. Id. at 1198.
11. 10 U.S.C.S. § 505(a) (Lexis 2004) provides that "qualified, effective, and able-
bodied persons who are not less than seventeen years of age, nor more than thirty-five
years of age" may enlist in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines or Coast Guard. On the
other hand, if the person is less than eighteen years of age, he must obtain consent from a
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register with selective service at the age of eighteen.' 2 Thus, while we
allow a child who has not reached eighteen to be entrusted with
defending our country, one year later, we require that same child, if a
male who has not already enlisted at the age of seventeen, to make his
name available for military service.13 But, that same seventeen-year-old
must wait until his eighteenth birthday to vote.' 4 Some jurisdictions
allow for exceptions to the usual requirement of reaching majority age in
order to marry or obtain a provisional driver's license. 15 Nonetheless, at
least one jurisdiction draws a very distinct line by not granting
individuals the right to sell or drink alcohol until the age of twenty-one. 16
In essence, the law blurs the lines that define separate classifications
for adults and youth in many instances. '7 As the U.S. Supreme Court
recently noted, "[d]rawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of
course, to the objections always raised against categorical rules. The
qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an
individual turns 18." 18 Despite these legal boundaries and the points at
which they are drawn, the U.S. Constitution arguably affords all
individuals certain protections under the law. The Constitution protects
individuals' rights that range from the freedom to practice our religious
beliefs and speak our political opinions without fear of federal
government oppression, 19 to protections that ensure against deprivation
parent or guardian if he has one. Id.
12. 50 U.S.C.S. § 453 (Lexis Supp. 2004).
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2306 (2003) (stating that no person may vote in
any election until he has reached the age of eighteen years).
15. ALA. CODE § 30-1-5 provides prerequisites for persons intending to marry that
are at least 16 years of age and under 18 years of age, and have not had a former wife or
husband. ALA. CODE § 30-1-5 (2004). The states of Alabama and Alaska also allow
youth who have at least obtained the age of 16 to obtain provisional driver's license after
satisfying certain delineated requirements. ALA. CODE § 32-6-7 (2004); 2004 Alaska
Sess. Laws 165.
16. See GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23 (2004) (stating that no person under the age of
twenty-one may furnish, purchase or possess alcoholic beverages).
17. For example, Florida law has constructed a waiver scheme that allows a child to
be tried as an adult, and once charged, treated as an adult in all respects. The
incongruence appears when, as one author notes, "children who are unable to drive, vote,
consume alcohol, hold public office, or even fight for our country, face up to
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole." Richard L. Rosenbaum, The
Aftermath of the Lionel Tate Case: Child's Play No Longer: Children Charged and Tried
as Adults in Florida-Ending up in Prison for Life Without Parole, 28 NOVA L. REv. 485
(2004).
18. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1197.
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
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of our liberty fights without due process of law. 20 Enforcement of these
protections generally extends to the states through application and
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.21
While the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly articulated its
interpretation of these constitutional protections for adults, the
application of those same protections has presented a greater challenge
when viewed in consideration of the historical treatment of youth under
our legal system. This article contends that the U.S. Supreme Court has
articulated an extension of certain constitutional protections that should
be afforded youth facing criminal adjudication.22 Nevertheless, certain
states utilize prosecutorial waiver methodology for transferring juveniles
into adult court that ignores the creation of an inherent conflict arising
from the prosecutor's dual function. This is done despite landmark cases
in the area of juvenile criminal adjudication that support application of
fairness principles including freedom from conflict to all youth
potentially facing adult court adjudication.23 These landmark decisions
in the area of juvenile justice articulate, not only constitutional
protections afforded to juveniles, but also proscribe the critical role of the
state under the doctrine of parens patriae that must operate within the
bounds of these protections.
Accordingly, Part II briefly discusses the origins of the doctrine of
parens patriae and its founding principles that shaped the history of our
juvenile justice system. Establishment of a juvenile court separate from
a criminal court marked one of the first reforms in the area of juvenile
24justice. However, like the nature of any reform movement, public
sentiment pressed the emergence of a new reform to address the
perceived failures of the juvenile justice system. Part III explains the
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.").
21. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896) (applying due
process principles of the Fourteenth amendment to California legislation providing for
the organization and governance of water irrigation districts as well as the acquisition and
distribution of water for irrigation purposes).
22. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(granting due process rights to juveniles being prosecuted by the state). See discussion
infra in Part V.B; N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (requiring that the Fourteenth
Amendment protect the rights of students against encroachment by public school
officials). See also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004) (requiring Miranda
Rights to be given before conducting custodial interrogation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (granting juveniles the right to counsel); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971) (granting juveniles the right to a jury trial).
23. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 541; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1; N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325;
Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. 2140; Gideon, 372 U.S. 335; McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528.
24. See Tonya Cole, Note, Counting Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes Under
California's 'Three Strikes' Law: An Undermining Of The Separateness of the Adult And
Juvenile Systems, 19 J. Juv. L. 335, 336 (1998).
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trend toward "Get Tough" legislation generated by the states in response
to societal frenzy and the enactment of prosecutorial waiver as a key
component in a concerted battle against juvenile crime. Part III also
defines the inherent conflict in waiving juvenile court jurisdiction
through the sole discretionary power of a prosecutor who represents the
state as parens patriae. Florida's statutory scheme serves as an
illustration for this point. After establishing the inherent conflict, Part IV
outlines the bases for constitutional violation of due process protections
afforded to juveniles based on established juvenile justice jurisprudence
25
in the face of the conflicting interests.
Part V examines how the articulation of due process and other
constitutional protections afforded to juveniles, such as Eighth
Amendment protection from imposition of the death penalty,26 support
the continued function of the state as parens patriae in a separate court
for juvenile criminal adjudications. In my opinion, the Roper decision
highlights the overwhelming need to "awaken this sleeping giant," or the
doctrine of parens patriae, and its protective role over the delinquent
child. This is vital because the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper based its
extension of Eighth Amendment protection to juveniles on documented
differences between children and adults.27 In fact, the first juvenile court
system originated from the belief that children are different from adults.28
Roper, therefore, resurrects this belief in a time where the perception of
distinction between young and old is blurred. This article will address
what the existence of a juvenile court system truly means today in light
of the doctrine of parens patriae, the Roper court's reasoning, and the
impact of transfer methods like discretionary prosecutorial waiver. In
the end, the reader should recognize that our juvenile justice system must
preserve the doctrine of parens patriae, and that any transfer
methodology that compromises its integrity violates a juvenile's due
process protections.
Nevertheless, consideration of a juvenile's due process rights is
secondary on the floor of the state legislatures as the chief battleground
in the "war" on juvenile crime. Theoretically, due process protections
should amass premier consideration by judges in the state courts who
must address the delegation of legislative authority to enact laws
governing the treatment of juveniles. Part VI examines arguments
asserted by juvenile defendants in their attack on prosecutorial waiver,
and refutes the state courts' response as it relates to the inherent conflict
25. Kent, 383 U.S. at 541; In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
26. Roper, 125 U.S. at 1183.
27. Id. at 1195.
28. Paolo G. Annino, Children in Florida Adult Prisons: A Call for a Moratorium,
28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 475 (2001).
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of interest. Ultimately, we must question whether the states' ends justify
their means. Part VII asserts that the erosion of the juvenile court system
is inevitable if prosecutorial waiver and the inherent conflict persist.
II. Parens Patriae: The Founding Philosophy of the Juvenile Court
System
The juvenile court system is unique because it was created to serve
a specific purpose-rehabilitation of the delinquent child.29  Centuries
ago, reformers recognized the need to handle children differently when
their behavior required some form of societal reprimand. 30 The primary
motivation of a specialized court for juveniles was to diagnose the
specific problem or environment that caused the child's malfeasance.
Such an agenda seemed almost improper to implement through the
traditional courts of law.
3 1
As a result, one of the first major reforms establishing a Juvenile
Court occurred in 1899 in Illinois under an Act that provided for separate
treatment of delinquent children.32 In order to serve the individualized
needs of a presumably misguided child, the Progressive reformers
initially founded the first juvenile court based upon a philosophy that
would promote the protective role of the state in matters regarding the
delinquent child.33 Under an English common law concept, the doctrine
of parens patriae allowed the King's chancellors to make decisions
29. See Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Note, Sentence Blending and the Promise of
Rehabilitation: Bringing the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
259, 265 (1999) (The establishment of the first juvenile court was rooted in notions of
social policy that dictated treatment of the delinquent child rather than punishment.). See
also Annino, supra note 28, at 473.
30. The problems presented by troubled youth have existed not only in America, but
also throughout other countries such as Europe and Australia. In some jurisdictions
outside the United States, delinquent children were held in separate jails and workhouses
than their older counterparts. The problem of the delinquent child raised familiar
questions of how society should resolve these issues when it was fairly commonplace that
the state operated in a unique role as the "ultimate parent of all the dependents within its
borders." Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). "Reformers,"
therefore, represented those who recognized that our common criminal law did not
distinguish adults from children when addressing fundamental concerns like punishment
rather than reformation of the child. Id. at 106, 107. With a therapeutic model in mind,
this country established the juvenile justice system recognizing that rehabilitation of the
juvenile requires a separate and distinct mechanism outside of the criminal courts.
Smallheer supra note 29, at 261.
31. In fact, a study conducted as part of the first reform measures in this country in
New York, the 1822 Report on the Penitentiary System in the United States, indicated
that children incarcerated with mature criminals become contaminated, thereby obviating
a reformatory goal. Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective,
22 STAN L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1969-1970). See also, Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1197.
32. Mack supra note 30, at 107; Fox supra note 31, at 1187.
33. Smallheer, supra note 29, at 265-66.
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regarding juveniles separate from the jurisdiction of the English criminal
courts.34 The doctrine, therefore, is premised upon operation of a state
representative who assesses the child's alleged delinquency and possible
needs independent from adult court.
35
The protective philosophy of parens patriae ultimately became the
benchmark for characterizing the role of the state and its representatives
as those acting in the best interest of the child. 6 The state utilized the
doctrine to justify substitution of its authority for that of the natural
parents over their children. 37  A representative of the state would
intervene between the natural parent and the child because the child
needed the protection due to an unwilling or ineffective parent.38 Hence,
the origins of the juvenile court are founded upon the doctrine of parens
patriae and its primary focus on the welfare of the child.39
By 1945, other jurisdictions followed Illinois in adopting a juvenile
court system. 40 Each one constructed a system in recognition of the
specific needs of delinquent children as distinct from those of adults.41
The judge responsible for making determinations on the disposition of
the child did not function in the same manner as his counterpart in the
adult system, but instead, interacted with the child in a manner that was
more like a parent.42 The particular nature of the juvenile court judges'
34. Stacey Sabo, Note, Rights of Passage: An Analysis Of Waiver Of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2425, 2429 (1996). The origins ofparens patriae are
derived from the English Court of Wards in 1540 where the court assumed wardship over
lunatics and the mentally ill under the philosophy of protection over those of diminished
capacity. Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY
L.J. 195, 196 (1978).
35. Mack, supra note 30, at 109. Although, in today's world, delinquent acts
committed by children do not always directly correlate with bad parenting, to the extent
that society endeavors to care for, or take responsibility for children in need of direction
or supervision under the law, this article suggests that the historical premise for the
doctrine of parens patriae is currently relevant.
36. See generally Susan A. Bums, Comment, Is Ohio Juvenile Justice Still Serving
Its Purpose?, 29 AKRON L. REv. 335 (1996); Fox, supra note 31, at 1193. The early
reform efforts employed the doctrine of parens patriae to express the state's responsibility
to intervene when children face the possibility of becoming criminals. Consequently, the
state's involvement today, just like in the early juvenile court, must consider operation of
the doctrine that fully incorporates the child's best interest.
37. Mack, supra note 30, at 109.
38. Id.
39. Sabo, supra note 34, at 2430.
40. See generally Burns, supra note 36, at 337. For example, Colorado was one of
the first states that followed Illinois in establishing a separate juvenile court. Mack,
supra note 30, at 107. Today, every state in the United States maintains a separate court
for juveniles. Gordon, supra note 4, at 197.
41. In fact, many states today fail to see key differences between a juvenile's
capacity to accept responsibility for his actions as compared to an adult. Gordon, supra
note 4, at 215. See also textual discussion on Roper in Part V.C.
42. Gordon, supra note 4, at 197.
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historical role, therefore, is best described as a "father-type" figure.4 3
Consistent with this "re-characterization" of the judiciary, juvenile
adjudication proceedings were also redefined as non-criminal rather than
punitive. 4  The casual environment indicated relaxation of certain
constitutional protections otherwise afforded adults based on the
rationale that the child's best interest cannot be served in the face of
constitutional formalities. 45 This was a "trade-off' that seemed logical
when, ultimately, the entire process and the individuals participating in it
strived toward a common ground-the best interest of the child.46
Nevertheless, the juvenile court system in many jurisdictions
eventually confronted criticism as the perceived gravity of juvenile
offenses increased and public confidence in the juvenile courts
decreased.47 The solution: pressure the legislature to structure more
punishment schemes with harsher penalties against juvenile offenders.4 8
Society cried out for retribution and justice.49 The "system" was not
working, and some still question whether the system should exist at all.50
In my opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper has provided a
compelling and timely answer-its full impact to be unveiled through the
reader's thoughtful consideration of this article's thesis. With this in
43. Smallheer, supra note 29, at 265. Juvenile court judges that were displeased
with the traditional high-seated bench would physically seat juveniles in a chair next to a
desk instead of a bench where the judge could interact more intimately with him during
the proceedings. Gordon, supra note 4, at 198.
44. Fox, supra note 31, at 1212. In fact, a common application of the 1899 Illinois
Juvenile Court Act utilized by the traditional juvenile court was to approach children with
a philosophy of protection rather than punishment for their misconduct. This is
consistent with the overall protective posture characterizing not only the judge's role, but
also the state's involvement under the parens patriae doctrine. Gordon, supra note 4, at
197. Furthermore, in the early 20th century, notions of the state's protective "hand" and
duty of the state to investigate delinquency cases with a mind toward reform continued to
predominate. Mack, supra note 30, at 107.
45. Gordon, supra note 4, at 198-199.
46. Id.
47. Sabo, supra note 34, at 2434-35.
48. Smallheer, supra note 29, at 272.
49. Gordon, supra note 4, at 203.
50. Critics of the juvenile court system, also known as "Abolitionists," favor a
unified system that would combine juvenile and adult offenders. Shannon F. McLatchey,
Note, Juvenile Crime And Punishment: An Analysis Of The "Get Tough" Approach, 10
U. FLA. J. L.. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 417 (1999); Kerrin C. Wolf, Justice By Any Other
Name: The Right To A Jury Trial And The Criminal Nature Of Juvenile Justice In
Louisiana, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 275, 279 (2003). Despite the laudable efforts of
the juvenile court system reformers, each jurisdiction, by the mid-twentieth century,
struggled with the increased criticism over administration of a separate juvenile court.
Specifically, the opponents point to arbitrary and inconsistent disposition of cases. The
individualized attention to cases became muddled by the haste in processing larger
volumes of cases. And, post disposition, the critics point to unsafe conditions in juvenile
institutions.
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mind, we must next examine the states' response to the deteriorating
confidence in the juvenile court system and the conflict that results.
III. The Origins of Prosecutorial Waiver and Its Inherent Conflict
A. From "Get Fixed" to "Get Tough "-A New Reform
Unyielding fear emerged in response to the overall increase in our
country's crime rate. As a result, society demanded a change in the way
our juvenile court system was administered. 1 Inevitably, the state
legislators struggled with social policy in response to the public outcry. 2
This legislative response marked a trend that began in the 1980s and
continued into the 1990s,which diverged away from the rehabilitative
goal of the juvenile court system. 53  The motivations that fueled the
states' response included pure fear and frustration over the perceived
increase in juvenile crimes committed and the seemingly inadequate
response of the juvenile court system that was charged to handle young
offenders. 4 Consequently, the rate of juvenile crimes, whether real or
imagined, received its degree of attention. In the late 1960s and 1970s,
an increase in juvenile arrests contributed to the public perception of an
increase in juvenile crimes. 55
As a result, most jurisdictions developed transfer schemes to enable
youth who committed more heinous crimes to be tried in the adult courts.
The punitive goal of this movement resulted in stricter laws and harsher
51. Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The
Case For Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 629,
633 (1994).
52. See Klein, supra note 4, at 390. The public outcry resulted from the portrayal of
an increase in violent crimes in the media and from the political agendas that were
promoted by state legislators. Klein notes, "[tlhe media and conservative politicians-
and recently moderate politicians as well-have scared middle-America into believing
that around every comer lurks a sixteen-year-old black male waiting to commit a
crime... " Id. at 372. See also Ernestine S. Gray, Symposium: Children, Crime, and
Consequences: Juvenile Justice in America: The Media-Don't Believe the Hype, 14
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 45 (2003).
53. McLatchey, supra note 50, at 406. Wolf, supra note 50, at 281. As a result of
the reform, the number of delinquency cases that were judicially waived to criminal court
increased seventy percent between 1985 and 1994; however, this number declined fifty-
four percent through 2000. OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book, at
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/court/qa06502.asp?qaDate=2003081 1.
54. McCarthy, supra note 51, at 629-30, 633.
55. Eric L. Jensen, The Waiver Of Juveniles To Criminal Court: Policy Goals,
Empirical Realities, And Suggestions For Change, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 173, 175 (1994).
The author suggests that the wave of baby boomers coming into adolescence caused an
increase in juvenile infractions, and therefore, a contributing factor in the perception of
juvenile crime.
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punishments for juvenile offenders. 6 The "get fixed" or rehabilitative
goal of the juvenile court system sustained frontal attack launched by
critics who called for yet another wave of reform. These same critics
oftentimes called for abolition of the juvenile court, blaming its
ineffectiveness on an inferior adjudicatory process and an inexperienced
or mediocre pool of lawyers.57 Arguments asserting lack of resources for
the adequate function of programs and services designed to presumably
handle juvenile offenders contributed to the decay in public confidence. 8
Transfer of juvenile offenders to adult courts was always an option
for the more highly visible and egregious juvenile cases, 59 however, as
this article asserts, the "Get Tough" era expanded the arms of juvenile
waiver schemes far beyond the reach of the "father-type" judicial figure
60
and delivered it into the hands of the legislature.
B. Prosecutorial Waiver: The "Trojan Horse" of Get Tough
Legislation
The battle against juvenile crimes commenced and the legislative
armor came fully equipped with the discretionary function of a key actor
in the criminal justice system-the prosecutor. Intent on sending a
message6 1 to the juvenile offender that the "counselor-judge" would no
longer serve as a "safe haven, 62 many state legislators exercised their
lawmaking powers to enact an expanded form of waiver. These
enactments effectuated the transfer of juvenile offenders through either
statutory provision excluding them from juvenile court jurisdiction
completely, or through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion for filing
charges under concurrent jurisdictional powers.63  While legislative
exclusion waiver draws its own criticisms,6 4 discretionary prosecutorial
waiver is the "Trojan Horse" 65 of the "Get Tough" era since embedded
56. McLatchey, supra note 51, at 407.
57. Id. at 417.
58. Id. See also Jensen, supra note 55 , at 174.
59. Jensen, supra note 55, at 188.
60. Smallheer, supra note 29, at 265.
61. Amy M. Thorson, Note, From Parens Patriae to Crime Control: A Comparison
of the History and Effectiveness of the Juvenile Justice Systems In The United States And
Canada, 16 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 845, 852 (1999).
62. Klein, supra note 4, at 377.
63. See discussion in Gordon, supra note 4, at 204.
64. Klein, supra note 4, at 390-92. Some proponents of legislative exclusion herald
this form of waiver as preferable over broad judicial discretion. Others recognize that it
also fundamentally opposes the basic purpose of the juvenile court. A prosecutor's
discretion and the conflict that is inherent to this form of legislative waiver similarly
contravenes the foundational principles of the juvenile court that are rooted in the
doctrine of parens patriae.
65. My analogy is derived from Greek Mythology where, after ten years of
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within the "belly" of the prosecutorial function, hides an inherent conflict
that impermissibly violates established constitutional protections
afforded to juveniles. Because of its unconstitutionality, the conflict will
ultimately weaken the "Trojan Horse" rather than empower it in the
battle.
Generally, prosecutorial waiver has received the greatest criticism
as compared to judicial and other legislative forms of waiver.6 6 Thus, it
is not so surprising that the controversy stems from the misplaced
legislative endowment of prosecutorial discretion in the juvenile court,
which is unique from adult criminal prosecution primarily because the
"impetus" behind the separate court system is treatment of children.
67
Prosecutorial waiver is particularly problematic because the juvenile
justice system was uniquely founded on the premise that delinquent
children must be handled apart from adults.68
At first glance, it may seem that the prosecutor's discretionary role
is well suited and, arguably, conditioned for determining whether the
facts of each case sufficiently establish probable cause, 69 and then
deciding the appropriate venue for filing the charge. When viewed in
this light, this invites the question of whether the prosecutor's function is
any different than that of the judge in judicial waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction? After all, in the process of determining venue to file in
juvenile or adult court, is the prosecutor really unable to make qualified
determinations of the individual child's amenability to rehabilitate?
Even further, so long as the Kent criteria 70 that judges use when
considering whether to waive a juvenile into adult court are satisfied, is
the "decision maker" who is charged with fairly accessing the entire
spectrum of considerations relevant to the child's disposition pivotal to
the determination?
The answer to all of these questions is a resounding, YES!
unsuccessful battling, the Greeks sought to conquer the city of Troy by building a huge
wooden horse in which a number of Greek heroes hid inside its belly. When the Trojans
unknowingly moved the horse into the city, the Greeks emerged from the horse and
successfully conquered it. Micha F. Lindemans, Trojan Horse, MMV Encyclopedia
Mythica, at http://www.pantheon.org/articles/t/trojanhorse.html (last visited May 16,
1999).
66. Klein, supra note 4, at 391.
67. Annino, supra note 28, at 473.
68. Thorson, supra note 61, at 846-47.
69. "Probable cause has been defined as reasonably trustworthy information
sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the crime at issue was committed
by the named defendant." Cassidy, supra note 5, at 15.
70. See discussion infra note 152 (listing specific criteria for consideration in waiver
decisions that will satisfy due process requirements).
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C. The Conflict Lies in the "Belly"
The underlying problem with prosecutorial discretion in waiver of
juvenile cases is the constitutionally prohibited conflict that arises when
the legislature unveils this "Trojan Horse" to fight its battle on juvenile
crime. The authority granted by the state legislatures places the
prosecutor in a role contrary to his responsibility as a representative of
the state under the juvenile court's founding doctrine of parens patriae.
This article does not argue, principally, against prosecutorial discretion
and its traditional function in our criminal justice system. Rather, it
intends to establish the constitutionally inappropriate exercise of this
discretion in juvenile transfer decisions when a conflict arises. As a
necessary starting point, we must first establish the conflict.
Stacey Sabo, in her note on the analysis of waiver in the juvenile
courts,71  sets forth observations about the particularly problematic
aspects of prosecutorial waiver that relate to the arguments set forth here.
Due to the prosecutor's interest in conviction, Sabo cleverly identifies
prosecutorial discretion as "antithetical" to the U.S. Supreme Court's
concern for juvenile rights.72  Thus, this article extends Sabo's
conclusions by asserting that the prosecutor's exercise of discretion is not
only "antithetical" to juvenile rights, but also constitutionally
impermissible when it generates a conflict with his doctrinal role as
parens patriae. First, Sabo acknowledges one of the most crucial
observations about the prosecutor's role that makes his function in the
juvenile justice system unique. That is, the prosecutorial waiver allows
and, arguably, requires the prosecutor to disregard his protective parent
role under the doctrine of parens patriae and thereby, ignore the best
interest of the child.73 This article expounds by suggesting that implicit
in the legislative grant of prosecutorial authority is society's expectation
that he, as representative of the sovereign, will practically consider
society's interest in retribution, and, if necessary, prioritize its punitive
agenda over his "other representation" as parens patriae7 4 These dual
functions constitute an unconstitutionally impermissible conflict.
Furthermore, since the doctrine of parens patriae serves as the
71. Sabo, supra note 34, at 2425.
72. Id. at 2447.
73. Id. at 2446.
74. The Bureau of Justice Statistics surveyed state judges and prosecutors to assess
why Florida, for example, held more juveniles for adult court prosecution than any other
state, and the majority of prosecutors who responded stated, "the availability of more
severe punishments in the adult criminal courts and corrections system was an important
consideration in the transfer decision." Contributing Factors to Number of Transfers, 7
Corr. Prof'l 11 (February 22, 2002), available at http://web.lexis.com/lawschoolreg/
researchlogin04.asp.
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cornerstone for justification of a separate legal system for delinquent
children,75 the "actors" in the system must act consistent with its
foundational philosophy of the child's best interest. 76  Upon critical
examination of the prosecutor's function in juvenile transfer cases, we
see an inherent conflict in his traditional representation as one who seeks
to do justice on behalf of society in an adversarial system as juxtaposed
against his representation as one who influences decisions regarding the
child's best interest in the juvenile court system.
The conflict becomes apparent, for example, if we examine the
essence of prosecutorial function. In dispensing with a case, the
prosecutor's creed is to seek justice and, "to take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed. '' 77 In an adversarial system, this means participation
in a process whereby the prosecutor seeks the truth in concert with an
opposing counsel. 78 In crimes against the community, the state attorney,
therefore, represents the community's interest in seeking justice against a
criminal defendant.79 Correspondingly, a defense attorney equally and
fairly represents the criminal defendant as part of the process of seeking
truth.8° While this explanation represents an oversimplification of the
adversarial process, it is offered only for the express purpose of
delineating functional roles in criminal adjudications and, most
importantly, the predisposition of the prosecutor in this process.
Now, by superimposing the prosecutor's function into the juvenile
justice system, one must recognize the potential for conflict if the
prosecutor is placed in a role where he, alone, decides the competing
interests of society and of the juvenile defendant. In the context of
waiver, the prosecutor might consider several factors under which the
competing interests lie. 81  For instance, commonly noted factors that
traditionally motivate a prosecutor's charging decision include strength
of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's
enforcement priorities and the case's relationship to the Government's
overall enforcement plan. 82 On the other hand, the factors considered in
75. Mack, supra note 30, at 1193.
76. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets The Principle Of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, And The Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 825 (1988).
77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See also, U.S.C.A. §§ 516 & 547 (West 2005).
78. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 1 (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Federal Prosecutor,
Speech delivered at the Second Annual Conference of U.S.Attorneys, (April 1, 1940)).
79. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 2.
80. Id. at 3. Cassidy further describes the role of the defense attorney in terms of his
duty to pursue his client's lawful objectives.
81. See infra textual discussion in Part IV.A.
82. Sabo, supra note 34, at 2448. See also textual discussion in Part VI.A on United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (where the Court reviewed prosecutorial
discretion under an Equal Protection Clause analysis. The Court lists these factors in its
explanation of judicial deference to a prosecutor's discretion and the presumption that the
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the charging venue of a juvenile case 83 have broader implications that are
influenced by the court system in which the case is adjudicated.
The prosecutor must, theoretically, consider each child's
amenability for treatment in the juvenile system when determining the
appropriate venue for adjudication. Specific factors to consider include
social service records, psychological reports, prior offenses and the
nature of those offenses, suitable treatment programs, and any other
information that would ultimately influence the child's best interest.
84
The foregoing factors are indigenous to a social policy whereby those
charged with the responsibility to make determinations based on these
factors operate under a protective, rather than adversarial role. Simply
put, "[n]o situation exists in the criminal justice system analogous to the
unfettered discretion many prosecutors enjoy in choosing the forum in
which to try a juvenile ... (and) a prosecutor cannot serve justice when
she must serve both the state and the best interest of the juvenile at the
same time. 85
Contrarily, one might view the conflict of interest as curable if the
juvenile consents to the prosecutor's waiver decision86 because he deems
it as consistent with the opposing side's interest in adult prosecution.87
prosecutor is more competent to assess such factors.).
83. Barry C. Feld, Criminal Law: The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the
Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
471, 487 (1987). For example, in Wyoming, when the prosecuting attorney exercises
discretion in filing a felony case against a seventeen-year-old, the statute requires that he
consider certain determinative factors. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §14-6-203(f)(iii). Such
factors include the seriousness of the offense and whether protection of the community
requires waiver, the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile, previous history of the
juvenile, the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile, etc. See WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-6-237(b)(i)-(vii) (Michie 2003).
84. See discussion infra note 152; see also Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67 (where the U.S.
Supreme Court in Kent articulates similar considerations for satisfaction of due process
requirements in waiver decisions).
85. Sabo, supra note 34, at 2447, 2451.
86. Commonwealth v. Croken, 733 N.E.2d 1005, 1010 (Mass. 2000) ("when a
genuine conflict exists, a defendant may consent to continued representation by his
attorney so long as his consent is voluntary, knowingly, and intelligently made"(quoting
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 681 N.E. 2d 818 (Mass. 1997)).
87. Let's consider a juvenile's treatment under Florida's sentencing and disposition
statutes to better illustrate the opposing interests in juvenile versus adult court treatment.
Generally, under Florida's statute that grants sentencing powers in delinquency cases, if a
child is prosecuted as an adult, the court can sentence him to either juvenile or adult
sanctions. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.233(4)(a), (b) (West 2004). This statute must be
compared with another section providing for other dispositional options relating to
delinquency cases. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.231 (West 2004). First, for sentencing to
adult sanctions under § 985.233(4)(a), the statutory scheme distinguishes between
children who commit an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment and those who
commit other offenses. When a child is found to have committed an offense punishable
by death or life imprisonment, the statute requires that the child be sentenced as an adult.
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This assumes, of course, that there are juveniles who seek adult
prosecution instead of juvenile court treatment, thereby obviating any
conflict. Nonetheless, in cases of clearly divergent interests, we must
consider whether consent under the circumstance of juvenile waiver can
cure an intrinsically unfair process.
Prosecutorial involvement and the resulting conflict in waiver of
juveniles into adult court are further illustrated by examination of
Florida's statutory scheme.88 The prosecutor's involvement is offered,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.233(4)(a) (West 2004). Since the Roper opinion, however, this
means only life imprisonment. See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1183. For all other offenses, the
court may sentence the child, (i) as an adult under Chapter 921-Sentencing Provisions,
(ii) under Chapter 958-Youthful Offender Act, or (iii) as a juvenile under
§ 985.233(4)(b). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.233(4)(a) (West 2004). See infra note 106
(further discussion on "youthful offender" programs). On the other hand, for sentencing
to juvenile sanctions under § 985.233(4)(b), juveniles transferred to adult court, but not
under the mandatory waiver or direct file provisions, may be placed in a probation
program under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice for an indeterminate
period until the age of 19 or sooner. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.233(4)(b)(1) (West 2004).
Alternatively, the court may also commit the child to the Department of Juvenile Justice
for treatment in an appropriate program for children for an indeterminate period until he
is 21 or sooner. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.233(4)(b)(2) (West 2004). Finally, the court may
order disposition as outlined under § 985.231 (granting other dispositional options in
delinquency cases including various probation and post- commitment programs under the
supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice), as an alternative to youthful offender
or adult sentencing. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.233(4)(b)(3) (West 2004). What is
interesting about Florida's statutory scheme is that it allows for juveniles transferred to
adult court to receive disposition as if they were adjudicated in juvenile court. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 985.233(4)(b)(3) (West 2004). Nevertheless, it still provides for potential adult
court sentencing sanctions once the child is transferred for adult prosecution and found to
have committed the offense. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.233(4)(a)(1), (2) (West 2004). The
state legislature, therefore, succeeds in providing a mechanism for adjudication and
ultimate disposition of a child as an adult sans rehabilitative or treatment options.
Additionally, it has been reported that prosecutors tended to devalue the seriousness of
available sanctions in the adult systems believing that only about twenty-five percent of
juveniles sentenced to adult facilities would actually serve time. To the contrary, nearly
seventy-five percent of them were placed in adult prisons. Contributing Factors to
Number of Transfers, supra note 74.
88. To begin with, during a period between 1992 and 2002, Florida transferred
between 3500 and 5300 juveniles a year into adult court. Id. Accordingly, the state's
transfer statutes and its impact provide a valuable construct in which to study
prosecutorial waiver. Generally, Florida's waiver scheme empowers the state attorney by
either mandating waiver of juveniles into the adult court based on the age of the child,
nature of the crime and frequency, or granting the state attorney with the discretion of
filing if the child has reached the specific age of 14 or 15 at the time of the alleged
offense. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(1), (2) (West 2003). This means that in addition to
crimes committed by a child of any age under Fla. Stat. § 985.225, the state attorney
must seek waiver of the child for prosecution as an adult under Fla. Stat. § 985.226
which applies to children who (i) are 14 years or older, (ii) have been adjudicated
delinquent previously for an act classified as a felony which adjudication was for
commission of, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit murder, sexual battery,
armed or strong-armed robbery, carjacking, home-invasion robbery, aggravated battery,
aggravated assault, or burglary with assault or battery, and (iii) and are being charged
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by illustration, for the purpose of defining his role within the construct of
the juvenile process.
D. Florida's Statutory Scheme-The Conflict Emerges
Prosecutorial conflict in Florida's delinquency code provisions8 9 is
best demonstrated in two sections, Intake and Case Management and
Detention, where the prosecutor is involved in making decisions that
affect the juvenile's progression through the system. When viewed
together with the transfer provisions, the conflicting role of the
prosecutor emerges. With regard to Intake and Case Management,
Florida's statutes require the juvenile probation officer (JPO) to consult
with the state attorney in determining, by probable cause standards, the
sufficiency of the report that alleges the delinquent act or violation of
law.90  The state attorney is then required to request additional
information when needed.9' Based on the satisfactory completion of the
probable cause report, the state attorney receives recommendation from
the JPO on whether to seek an information or indictment by the grand
jury.
92
However, under the Intake provision, the state attorney may, ... in
all cases take action independent of the action or lack of action of the
juvenile probation officer, and shall determine the action which is in the
best interest of the public and the child., 93 With regard to Detention, if
the JPO has received custody of a child from a law enforcement agency,
then he can determine that the child should be released based upon the
results of a risk assessment instrument.94 However, the JPO must contact
the state attorney for authorization to release the juvenile.
95
with a second or subsequent violent crime against a person. FLA. STAT. ANN
§ 985.226(2)(b)(1) (West 2003). Similarly, for children who (i) are 14 years of age or
older when they have committed a fourth or subsequent alleged felony offense, and
(ii) was previously adjudicated delinquent or had adjudication withheld or was found to
have committed, or to have attempted or conspired to commit three offenses that are
felonies, and (iii) one or more of such felony offenses involved the use or possession of a
firearm or violence against a person, the state attorney must certify the child for
prosecution as an adult. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.226(2)(b)(2) (West 2003). However,
under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(1), the state legislature grants discretionary power to
the state attorney if the child is 14 or 15 years old and the state attorney's judgment and
consideration of public interest requires that adult sanctions be imposed for commission
of, attempt to commit or conspiracy to commit crimes such as arson, sexual battery,
robbery, murder, etc. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(1) (West 2003).
89. Id.
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.21(3), (4) (West 2004).
91. Id.
92. FLA. STAT. ANN. § Id. at 985.21(4)(a) (West 2004).
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.21(4)(d) (West 2004).
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.215(t)(c) (West 2004).
95. Id.
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With respect to transfer, Florida utilizes judicial and legislative
waiver.96 Under "voluntary waiver," a child's case is transferred from
juvenile court jurisdiction by the juvenile court judge.97 In this instance,
the prosecutor's discretion is minimized as compared to the legislative
exclusion provisions because his involvement amounts to filing a motion
to the court that will ultimately decide upon waiver.98 On the other hand,
under "mandatory direct file," a prosecutor is required to either, file an
information seeking adjudication as an adult, 99 or exercise discretion
when, "... in the state attorney's judgment and discretion the public
interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or imposed. ...
The prosecutor's conflict unfolds when viewing his potential
involvement with a case as early as the intake stage of processing, along
with his discretionary function at the point of proceeding to adjudication.
Now, one might view the prosecutor's involvement from the early stages
of handling the juvenile offender as a welcomed thread of consistency.
Certainly this would be the case if, in fact, the prosecutor's function
throughout the process consistently reflected the role that he must
assume under the juvenile justice system's founding social policy of
parens patriae. But when the legislature places the prosecutor in a
conflicting position at the time of potential waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction, then the prosecutor's involvement infringes upon the
juvenile's constitutional right to due process and fair treatment under the
law.
For instance, the prosecutor becomes involved during the intake and
case management stage to ensure that the "fact finding" process
surrounding the delinquent act is sufficient to support the alleged
violation, or in other words, meets the standard of probable cause.' 0 ' At
this point, it is assumed that the prosecutor, along with the intake officer,
probation officer and any other juvenile justice officer, operates under
the common premise that any decision made on behalf of the child will
be made with his best interest in mind. If undue concern is given toward
the welfare of the community, it is tempered by the impartiality of those
juvenile court "actors" whose disposition is not otherwise inclined
toward the motivations of society in punishing the child. Nevertheless,
if, at the intake stage, the prosecutor is required to exercise discretion in
determining any action, "which is in the best interest of the public and
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 985.226-.227 (West 2004).
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.226(1) (West 2004).
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.226(1), (2) (West 2004).
99. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(2) (West 2004).
100. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(1) (West 2004).
101. Cassidy, supra note 5, at 15.
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the child,"'102 how then can he also consider, at the point of possible
waiver, filing an information in adult court when, "in [his] judgment and
discretion the public interest requires that adult sanction be considered
or imposed... , This statutory scheme begs the question, "what
changed?"
On one hand, the prosecutor is charged with fairly balancing the
interest of the public and the child during the intake process. Can we
presume, even at that stage, that he does so consistent with his
"protective parent" role? On the other hand, can the prosecutor be
expected to abandon his protective function as representative of the state
under the doctrine of parens patriae when considering a decision of such
gravity and consequence as juvenile versus adult court adjudication?
The state legislatures certainly believe so. Nevertheless, the presence of
competing interests in our adversarial system amounts to a defined
conflict that is constitutionally impermissible under established due
process and juvenile justice jurisprudence.
IV. The Inherent Conflict Is Comprised of Competing Interests that
Violate Juveniles' Due Process Rights
A. Juveniles' Interests Compete with Society's Interest in Waiver
Decisions
Since conflict of interest in our legal system is premised on the
notion that opposing sides in an adversarial system must be represented
fairly due to each sides'divergent interests, 10 4 it is necessary to delineate
instances where juveniles' interests compete with the states' interests,
thereby creating a conflict in prosecutorial waiver. It is no secret that the
state legislators crafted prosecutorial waiver in an effort to expedite
102. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.21(4)(d) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(l)(a) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
104. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2003) which states, "a
lawyer shall not represent a client if representation involves a concurrent conflict of
interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: ... (2) there is a significant risk that
the representation of one ... client will be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person .. " Whether the
characterization of the prosecutor's "relationship" and function with respect to the
juvenile's interests is accepted, analogously, as a attorney-client relationship or not, (see
textual discussion in Part III), this definition sets forth the professional edict under which
all attorneys in the profession are governed by. That is to say, the definition of conflict of
interest implicitly takes into consideration the function of attorneys in our adversarial
system and consideration of the inherent conflicts that exists when opposing sides are
represented within that system. In the case of prosecutorial waiver, the dual function of
the prosecutor denotes a "representation" of the juvenile, as a primary "stakeholder,"
albeit "client," and the state, as the opposing "stakeholder."
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prosecution of juveniles in criminal court. 10 5 Notwithstanding any other
identified interests, this motivation of the state (represented by the
prosecutor) as the opposing party in criminal adjudication is
fundamentally contrary to a juvenile's interest in avoiding adult
prosecution. Therefore, there are competing interests, because the
treatment philosophies and the resulting disposition options are different
in the juvenile system as opposed to the adult system.
10 6
Primarily, we must remember that implicit in the purpose of
expedited adult prosecution are the goals of retribution and deterrence.'0°
While researchers indicate that juveniles are generally treated more
leniently in criminal court than in juvenile court,'0 8 this article suggests
that some, perhaps not all, juveniles are not interested in facing adult
court consequences. And there is an inextricable link between the waiver
decision and ultimate disposition options in both court systems.10 9
Professor Barry Feld very astutely notes, "[t]he waiver decision is a form
of sentencing decision that represents a choice between the explicitly
punitive dispositions of adult criminal courts and the nominally
105. See Klein, supra note 4, at 394.
106. Some states, like Florida, have developed Youthful Offender Programs to
address treatment of juvenile inmates incarcerated in adult prison. Proponents of transfer
might offer these programs as argument to refute the notion of competing interests
between the juvenile and the state. It appears that the needs of children are addressed in
such programs by separating them from the adult prison population. For example, under
Florida's Youthful Offender Program:
The court may sentence as a youthful offender any person (a) who is at least
18 years of age or who has been transferred for prosecution to the criminal
division of the circuit court pursuant to chapter 985; (b) who is found guilty
of, or who has tendered, and the court has accepted, a plea of nolo
contendere or guilty to a crime which is, under the laws of this state, a felony
if such crime was committed before the defendant's 21st birthday; and, (c)
who has not previously been classified as a youthful offender under the
provisions of this act; however, no person who has been found guilty of a
capital or life felony may be sentenced as a youthful offender under this act.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 958.04 (West 2004). Despite this attempt by the state legislatures to
put a "band-aid" on the realities of juvenile transfer, as many as 104 children in the
Florida Department of Corrections under the age of eighteen have been found associating
with the adult inmates. And, those child inmates who are designated as youthful
offenders wait for the treatment and services presumably offered under the program.
Annino, supra note 28, at 471.
107. See Klein, supra note 4, at 402. The punitive philosophy looses credibility in the
face of reality where, ". .. most juveniles who are transferred to adult court ... are not
violent offenders, but rather those who have committed property crimes." Thorson,
supra note 61, at 855.
108. See Klein, supra note 4, at 402.
109. See Douglas A. Hager, Does The Texas Juvenile Waiver Statute Comport With
The Requirements Of Due Process?, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 813, 824 (1995) (where the
author asserts the connection between waiver decisions and sentencing options relative to
their rehabilitative versus punitive philosophies).
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rehabilitative dispositions of juvenile courts."" 0 Professor Feld notes the
principal difference between the penal philosophy of adult courts and the
rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile courts."' The differences in
philosophy adopted by the two systems stand alone as substantiation for
conflicting interests of parties who advocate one system's treatment over
another.
Perhaps another illustration of conflicting interests between the
juvenile and the state is evidenced in the judicial waiver process where,
upon motion of the prosecutor, the juvenile, or the judge, a waiver
hearing is conducted.' 12  At this hearing, the state and the juvenile
present evidence regarding personal consideration relevant to the
juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation or suitability for adult court
prosecution. 13  Arguably, if the prosecutor uses social service or
psychological reports and witness interviews to support society's interest
in transfer, his conduct conflicts with the juvenile's interest who might
present similar information to support continued juvenile court treatment.
In this instance, the conflict is not realized if the judge ultimately
determines waiver. However, the example illustrates the presence of
opposing interests in waiver decisions and the prosecutor's representative
role once the waiver process is initiated. Whether illustrated in a waiver
hearing or bypassed through prosecutorial discretion, the competing
interests that comprise the conflict inhere.
B. Competing Interests that Inherently Conflict Are Unconstitutional
Generally, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that conflict of
interests violate due process rights.' 14 The conflict that is inherent to the
110. See Feld, supra note 83, at 487.
111. Id. at 488.
112. Sabo, supra note 34, at 2425.
113. Id.
114. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981). The court held that conflict of
interests violated due process and remanded the case based on the strong possibility of
conflict arising from an attorney's representation of employees of an adult theatre
charged with distributing obscene material. The counsel also represented the owner-
employer of the adult theatre who eventually refused to pay the court imposed fines
assessed against the employees as a condition of probation. The court specifically notes a
risk of conflict that relates, under my analogy, to the prosecutor's waiver decision. It
states, "Another kind of risk is present where ... [one] party... may have had a long
range interest in establishing a legal precedent and could do so only if the interest of the
defendant were sacrificed." Id. at 269-70. Here, the court contemplates a situation
similar to when the state (one party) uses traditional prosecutorial discretion to file
charges against a juvenile (the other party) in adult court in order to justify its long range
interest or goal of "sending a message" to "future" juvenile criminal defendants that adult
court prosecution is looming. This goal is accomplished at the sacrifice of the juvenile's
best interest under the doctrine of parens patriae. Thorson, supra note 61, at 852.
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prosecutor's discretion exercised in juvenile waiver cases, however, is
analogous to one that can arise from a prosecutor's subsequent
representation. In State ex rel. Sherrod v. Carey,115 the Texas Court of
Appeals held that the juvenile's due process rights were violated as a
result of prosecutorial conflict during a certification proceeding." 6 The
problem commenced when a fifteen-year-old committed capital murder.
The State sought certification as an adult under section 54.02 of the
Texas Family Code by filing a petition for discretionary waiver.
1 17
The child's parents requested representation of counsel based on
indigence. Mr. Gene Fristoe, the court-appointed attorney, participated
in interviewing the child, witnesses, and researching the law in order to
gather information relevant to the child's maturity and sophistication. 18
This information would ultimately be presented at the child's
certification hearing. However, Mr. Fristoe was subsequently hired as a
prosecutor in the Randall County Criminal District Attorney's office
several weeks into his representation of the child." 9  The District
Attorney thereafter isolated Fristoe from the case and the court appointed
another attorney. When the newly appointed counsel moved to
disqualify the entire District Attorney's office based on the conflict, the
trial court complied and appointed a special prosecutor.
20
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's prior role as
a juvenile's defense counsel conflicted with his subsequent position as a
prosecutor in the same case because (1) under the statute' 2 ' that defines
his role as representative of the state, the prosecutor's subsequent
appointment where he must pursue the state's interest is contrary to his
prior role where he pursued the juvenile's interest, (2) the resulting
conflict of interest violated the juvenile's due process rights, (3) the mere
appearance of impropriety existed as a result of the conflict, and (4) the
prior role of the prosecutor as defense counsel gave him access to facts
that he could later use against the juvenile. 22 The court concludes,
"there are circumstances in which ... adverse employment by members
of the district attorney's office ... [violate] ... the constitutional rights
115. State ex reL. Sherrod v. Carey, 790 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App. Amarillo, 1990).
116. Id. at 708.
117. Id. at 707.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The state subsequently appealed by filing a writ of mandamus to compel the
trial court to vacate the orders that disqualified the District Attorney's office and a writ of
prohibition against the special prosecutor to prevent his representation of the state. Id. at
706.
121. TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 2.01 (Vernon 2004).
122. Sherrod, 790 S.W.2d at 708.
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of a defendant.0
23
Under my analogy, the prosecutor's prior representation as defense
counsel in Sherrod is similar to his function under the doctrine of parens
patriae. Generally, a defense counsel is charged with the responsibility
of serving as an advocate of the criminal defendant. 124 His principal
function is to assert legal arguments in support of the defendant's best
interest during the adjudicatory process. 125  Likewise, the principal
function of the prosecutor in the juvenile justice system is to represent
the state as parens patriae.126  This means he must view facts and
circumstances surrounding a delinquent's case for the purpose of
determining his best interest. But, when the prosecutor later uses his
discretion to consider transfer of a delinquent into adult court, the
"subsequent representation" as an advocate of the state conflicts with his
"prior representation" as parens patriae.
Now, one might object to the semantics of timing regarding "prior
and subsequent representation" when describing the prosecutor's role. If
so, the spirit of the conflict is even more evident. Specifically, the
prosecutor's function or representation cannot serve the interests of
opposing sides, whether it occurs prior to, subsequent to, or
simultaneously. One might also object to the overall analogy. Certainly,
the prosecutor does not establish a traditional attorney-client relationship
with the juvenile. My analogy is offered, however, to characterize the
essential foundation of the relationship between the juvenile criminal
defendant and the prosecutor as parens patriae. By representing the state
in juvenile court, the prosecutor is acting as an advocate of the child's
best interest. But as long as the prosecutor's function in the juvenile
court system remotely mimics a defense counsel's function, an inherent
conflict exists. Because the prosecutor holds a uniquely distinct role
within the juvenile court in his "representation" as an agent of the state,
any functions he serves within that system must be consistent with the
child's best interest, and in no way contrary.
Moreover, in Sherrod, the court observed that when Fristoe
123. Id.
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (2003) (stating that, "an advocate
in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client's case with
persuasive force").
125. People v. Moore, 189 Cal. Rptr. 487, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (where the court
determined that the defense counsel's decision to request a mistrial was an appropriate
function of the trial attorney representing the best interests of the defendant).
126. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). In Kent, the U.S. Supreme
Court clearly characterized the state's role as a servant under the doctrine of parens
patriae and not as a prosecutor. Accordingly, the Court directs the mission and purpose
of the state's representative, the prosecutor, in juvenile court. See also textual discussion
in Part V.A.
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gathered information through interviews and research, he was developing
"undisclosed opinions" about factors like the child's maturity and
sophistication that he may use if called as a material witness in the
certification hearing. 27 These are factors that the state attorney under
prosecutorial waiver might consider prior to waiver according to the
child's best interest. 28 However, once the decision for certification as an
adult must be made, he is also expected to act as a district attorney who
represents the state,' 29 and, as seen in Florida, "with the public interest
requir[ing] that adult sanction be considered or imposed."'' 30  The
prosecutor's role as parens patriae becomes contrary to the juvenile's
interest when the prosecutor is given authority to decide the course of his
treatment or management within the juvenile system as opposed to the
adult system.
While the prosecutor's access to individual facts are used to aid
other juvenile court "actors" in determining rehabilitation goals and
treatment options,' 3' if he is then granted the authority to contravene
those goals and seek adult certification, the same facts can be used for
the distinctly antithetical goal of adult court prosecution. Unlike any
other adult criminal process, prosecutorial waiver authorizes the
prosecutor to function supporting one side's interest while, at the same
time, advocating the other side's position as well. In fact, the Texas
Court of Appeals in Sherrod notes that, "[t]he State's assurances that
Fristoe had been isolated from other members of the District Attorney's
office is an acknowledgment that an apparent conflict of interests
exists." 
132
Likewise, one of the most poignant aspects of this conflict is that it
so clearly becomes intolerable if the criminal defendant is an adult. In
Ex parte Spain, 3 3 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
127. Sherrod, 790 S.W. 2d. at 707.
128. Marissa Slaten, Note, Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court: Whose Right Is It
Anyway?, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 828 (2003). Individual factors pertaining to the
child's treatment were listed in the Appendix of the Kent opinion. Slaten refers to them
as, "more akin to a list of relevant factors than a list of required elements". This article
suggests that factors regarding individualized treatment are available to the prosecutor in
the exercise of his discretion.
129. TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.01 (Vernon 2004).
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(1)(a) (West 2004).
131. Stephan E. Oestreicher, Toward Fundamental Fairness In The Kangaroo
Courtroom: The Due Process Case Against Statutes Presumptively Closing Juvenile
Proceedings, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1751, 1763-64 (2001). Because the juvenile court does
not determine guilt or innocence like in a criminal trial, its processes and the "actors"
who implement them such as the probation staff strive to accomplish the best interest of
the child.
132. Sherrod, 790 S.W.2d at 707.
133. Exparte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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defendant's due process rights had been denied when the prosecutor,
who petitioned for revocation of his probation and represented the state
at the revocation hearing, was also his defense counsel when he pled
guilty. 134 In its opinion, the court also examined Article 2.01 of the
Texas Criminal Code of Procedure135 and concluded that a duty to avoid
conflict of interest is imposed on the prosecutor. However, the court
noted that, "[t]he prosecutor in this case should never have initiated or
participated in the revocation proceedings."
136
The court viewed the nature of the prosecutor's involvement in the
case as improper and stated that he should not have been placed into the
position that would enable him to use his prior role to influence a
decision on whether to even proceed with revocation.137 Similarly, under
my theory, the prosecutor in juvenile cases cannot use his protective role
under the doctrine of parens patriae to subsequently impact the juvenile
by deciding to proceed against him for adjudication as an adult. The
nature of the prosecutor's involvement that spans both the juvenile and
adult systems places him in a position of conflict. This violates an adult
criminal defendant's due process rights and so it follows that it also
violates a juvenile's due process rights.
In addition, the Spain court cited to the commentary for Section 1.2
of the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the Prosecution
Function and the Defense Function. The commentary states, "[I]t is of
the utmost importance that the prosecutor avoids participation in a case
in circumstances where any implication of partiality may cast a shadow
over the integrity of the office. ' 1 38 It is notable that the commentary
contemplates the prosecutor's "participation" in a case without
qualification as to the type of participation or at what stage of the case
this "participation" takes place. The emphasis should be, therefore, on
the term, "any", to describe the implication of partiality. Even if the
prosecutor gives some consideration to the welfare of society, his
juvenile court role as parens patriae dictates partiality in favor of the
child's best interest. This partiality conflicts with the expectation of
society and of the state legislators, as we have seen expressed in
Florida's statutory language, that the prosecutor also consider the public
interest in adult sanctions being imposed. 39 Whether it is expressly
stated in the legislative language or just reflected in the motivations
behind prosecutorial waiver legislation, the partiality is present and
134. Id. at 134.
135. TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.01 (Vernon 2004).
136. Exparte Spain, 589 S.W. 2d at 134.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(1)(a) (West 2004).
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indicates the inherent conflict.
Furthermore, it may seem pivotal that a district attorney's decision
to prosecute or even where to prosecute is made pre-adjudication or prior
to the filing of a criminal charge. 140 This article suggests that juvenile
justice jurisprudence articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court has afforded
due process protections to juveniles that would not be limited by the
technicalities of timing or venue.
V. Juveniles are Afforded Due Process Protections
A. Prosecutorial Waiver Intercepts Due Process/"Full Investigation"
as Required by Kent v. United States
The U.S. Supreme Court first reviewed a state's statutory scheme
for juvenile transfer proceedings in Kent v. United States. 14' In that case,
Morris A. Kent was a fourteen-year-old who was first arrested after a
series of crimes involving housebreakings and purse snatching. While he
was serving probation for these crimes, a woman was raped in her
apartment where some latent fingerprints matched those of Morris
Kent.142 Because he was sixteen at the time of his alleged rape arrest, the
Juvenile Court in the District of Columbia exercised exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. 143 After his arrest, Kent was taken to police
headquarters where he, presumably admitted to involvement in the house
breaking, robbery and rape, after approximately seven hours of
interrogation. 144 Kent was then taken to a Receiving Home for Children
where he spent the night and remained in custody there for almost one
week without an arraignment or other probable cause determination. 1
45
Kent's mother retained counsel the next day while Kent was still
detained and subject to interrogation. 146 During this time, the attorney
requested access to Kent's social services file and that a hearing be held
on the possible waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction so that proof of
Kent's suitability for rehabilitation could be offered. 14 7  Under the
applicable D.C. Juvenile Code Act, the juvenile court judge may waive
jurisdiction over a child that is sixteen years of age or older and is
140. See United States v. Anthony Sainto and Vincent Sainto, N.Y.L.J.,Jun. 4, 1999,
at 37 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 4, 1999) (quoting Paradise v. CCI Warden, 136 F.3d 331, 336 (2d
Cir), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 94 (1998)).
141. Kent, 383 U.S. 541.
142. Id.at 543.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 544.
145. Id. at 544-45.
146. Id. at 544.
147. Klein, supra note 4, at 378.
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charged with a felony after the judge conducts a "full investigation."
1 48
Despite this legislative "mandate," the judge neglected to hold a
hearing or rule on defense counsel's motions for a hearing and for access
to social service files. Instead, he entered an order that did not state
specific findings, but merely referenced the "full investigation" language.
As a result, juvenile court jurisdiction was waived allowing for a trial to
be held in adult court on the alleged offenses. 149  Kent eventually
appealed the waiver order, but was subsequently indicted by a grand
jury. At trial, he was sentenced to a total of thirty to ninety years in
prison.1 50 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, and
Kent appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
15'
Although the Court's seminal opinion does not address
prosecutorial waiver, it provides for due process protections in the
context of key observations regarding the juvenile court process and the
prosecutor's role as parens patriae. In examining the District of
Columbia's statutory language and the juvenile court process, the Court
held that the D.C. Juvenile Court Act, which allowed waiver of
jurisdiction after a "full investigation," must require a court to conduct a
hearing. 52 At the waiver hearing, the juvenile must be provided with
counsel who has access to the juvenile's social service records and
probation reports. Because the D.C. statute in Kent did not set forth
specific criteria for the judge to consider in making a determination to
waive juvenile court jurisdiction, the Supreme Court included a list of
determinative factors in its Appendix to the opinion. 153 Furthermore, the
148. Kent, 383 U.S. at 547-48 (Although Kent involved a case of judicial waiver, the
Court's interpretation of the jurisdictional statute and its reasoning articulates principles
of fundamental fairness owed juveniles and the proper function/role of the state in
juvenile justice proceedings.).
149. Id. at 546-49 (Interestingly, the juvenile court staff recommended to the court
that consideration be made for the possibility of Kent's mental illness; however, the
juvenile court judge's order did not reflect consideration of these recommendations.
Nonetheless, the District Court received and referred to Kent's emotional condition after
the prosecutor opposed any findings on his incompetence to stand trial.).
150. Kent, 383 U.S. at 549; see also McLatchey, supra note 50, at 404 (discussing the
District Court's consideration of counsel's motion to dismiss the grand jury indictment on
the grounds of an invalid waiver order, but ultimately ruling that the statutory language
referencing a "full investigation" did not require a judicial hearing).
151. Kent, 383 U.S. at 541.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 557. These factors include, in pertinent part, the following: seriousness of
the alleged offense and whether protection of the community requires waiver, whether
the alleged offense was committed in a violent or willful manner, whether the alleged
offense was against persons or property, the prosecutive merit of the complaint
(consulting with the U.S. attorney as to whether there is sufficient evidence upon which a
Grand Jury would return an indictment), sophistication and maturity based on home
environment and emotional attitude, the record and previous history of the juvenile with
juvenile court or other law enforcement agencies, the prospects for adequate protection of
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Court required that juvenile court provide a statement of reasons
accompanying its waiver order. 1
54
When commencing its analysis, the Court emphasized the
constitutional due process restriction placed on the D.C. Juvenile Court
statute as it pertained to the judge's discretionary waiver determination.
The Court stated, "the statute contemplates that the Juvenile Court
should have considerable latitude ... [b]ut this latitude is not
complete . . . it assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular
circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and
fairness."' 155 Immediately, the Court noted that any state legislation or
prescribed methodology involving waiver of juveniles must essentially
pass constitutional muster. This article asserts, therefore, that juveniles
are entitled to due process protections during any transfer process
because the Court's analysis of the statutory language, "full
investigation," and its practical application was not limited to the "actor"
or "decision maker."
That is, the meaning of "full investigation" fully encompasses due
process protections to be afforded juveniles notwithstanding which
parties are involved in the decision to transfer to criminal court. Thus, it
seems that the Court did not intend to limit the protections to judicial
determinations only as presented under the Kent facts, but the Court
would also extend those protections to prosecutorial waiver methods.
Consequently, the prosecutor's discretion in prosecutorial waiver
jurisdictions presents an unusually problematic conflict' 56 that violates
the constitutional protections articulated in Kent.
In addition, the state legislators utilize discretionary prosecutorial
waiver for transferring juveniles into adult court despite the fact that the
Supreme Court in Kent expresses adamant concern over such
processes. 157 The Court states the following:
[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching such
tremendous consequences without ceremony-without hearing,
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of
the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile if convicted of
the alleged offense by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to
the Juvenile Court. After stating the determinative factors, the court adds, "[i]t is the
responsibility of any officer of the court's staff assigned to make the investigation of any
complaint in which waiver ... is being considered to develop fully all available
information which may bear upon the criteria ... the Judge will consider the relevant
factors in a specific case before reaching a conclusion to waive juvenile jurisdiction ......
Id. at 567.
154. Slaten, supra note 128, at 828.
155. Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
156. See supra Part III.
157. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(1) (West 2004).
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reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with
adults ... would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if
society's special concern over children, as reflected in the District of
Columbia's Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure. We hold
that it does not.
158
In my opinion, the Court's poignant language supports extending the
same due process protections that are enjoyed by adults to juveniles.
These statements were made just after the Court explained that its
decision in Kent was not made on the merits. Even if the Court's holding
was based only on the procedural aspects of the case, 159 this perceived
limitation is moot after the development of subsequent juvenile justice
jurisprudence that articulates notions of substantive due process
principles. 60  Since the authority for establishing and governing a
juvenile court is a function of state law in most jurisdictions, 61 it seems
clear that the Supreme Court did more than just correct the procedural
errors of a state lower court in 1966. The Court also spoke indirectly to
future state lawmakers who purport to have a separate system for
criminal juvenile adjudication, yet fail to recognize the importance of
due process protections afforded to all, not just to adults.
The Kent opinion continued on this point by expressing particular
concern over concepts of fundamental fairness as they operate within the
unique and historical auspices of the parens patriae doctrine. The Court
stated the following:
The theory of the District's Juvenile Court Act, like that of other
jurisdictions, is rooted in social welfare philosophy ... [t]he State is
parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney ... [b]ut the
admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not an invitation
to procedural arbitrariness. Because the State is supposed to proceed
in respect of a child as parens patriae and not as adversary ....62
Here, the Court not only acknowledged the traditional motivations and
goals of the juvenile court as rooted in concepts of social welfare and
protection of children, but also reproved the state legislatures who might
otherwise construct laws, like the statute in Kent, that are inconsistent
with these well established principles. This article posits that some
jurisdictions have done just that through legislation empowering a
prosecutor with the sole discretion to file charges against a juvenile in
criminal court while sitting in direct conflict with his role as parens
158. Kent, 383 U.S. at 554.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., In re Gault, 397 U.S. 1.
161. Slaten, supra note 128, at 845.
162. Kent, 383 U.S at 554-55.
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patriae. 163
Essentially, the state as embodied in the prosecutorial function,
operates as parens patriae and is charged with making decisions that
impact the disposition of minors. Since the prosecutor represents the
state in juvenile court, his actions must reflect the rehabilitative goals of
the juvenile court. Based on Kent, this means that he must also abide by
principles of due process such as fairness and freedom from conflict.
Although the Kent court specifically admonished practices that may lead
to procedural arbitrariness, 164 it seems that when the prosecutor must
reconcile a child's best interest with society's punitive goals, he violates
the spirit of fair treatment under the law. For these reasons, the conflict
of interest presented by the prosecutor's sole discretion in juvenile
waiver cases falls within the purview of the Kent opinion, and must also
be measured against the extension of due process protection to juveniles
in a subsequent opinion, In re Gault, 165 made the following year.
B. Gault Further Exposes Prosecutorial Waiver as Violating Notions of
Fundamental Fairness
In yet another landmark decision, the U.S. Supreme Court extended
specific constitutional protections enjoyed by adults to juveniles. 66 The
Gault opinion represents a movement away from the traditional setting of
the juvenile court system where constitutional protections were
somewhat ignored in consideration of the perceived rehabilitative goals
of juvenile delinquency adjudication.167 Although Gault is not a transfer
case, the opinion addresses pertinent concepts of criminal juvenile
adjudication that relate to the states' present day use of prosecutorial
discretion.
Decided one year after Kent, the Gault decision examined several
provisions of the Arizona Juvenile Code challenged by Gerald Gault, a
fifteen-year-old boy taken into custody after a verbal complaint by a
neighbor.' 68  Gault allegedly made lewd and indecent remarks in
telephone calls to the neighbor's home. 169 The police took Gault into
custody without his parents' knowledge, and without any subsequent
163. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c) (Michie 2004); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 707(d) (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-517(2) (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 985.226-.227 (West 2005); LA. CIVIL CODE ANN. art. 305(B)(3) & 305(B)(3)(4) (West
2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-274 (Michie 2003); WvO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-203(f)
(Michie 2003).
164. Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
165. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
166. Id.
167. Feld, supra note 83, at 472.
168. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
169. Id.
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attempts to notify them. 7° Gault remained at a Children's Detention
Home into the following day, at which time an officer filed a petition
with the court.'
7 1
Two days later, Gault was released without explanation in the
record as to why he was detained or why he was released. 172 However,
his mother received notice of further hearing on Gault's delinquency.
1 73
At this second hearing, Gault and his parents were present and the court
heard testimony from Gault and another boy who also allegedly made the
lewd remarks.1 74  The complainant-neighbor was absent from this
proceeding. When questioned, the judge answered that her presence was
not required. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge committed
Gault to the State Industrial School until he was twenty-one, unless
discharged sooner.1 75  At the time, no appeal was permitted under
Arizona law in juvenile cases. 176 Nevertheless, a petition for writ of
habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court of Arizona 177 who, in
response to challenges for violation of several basic rights, 7 8 held that
due process protections are constitutionally required when a juvenile
faces the possibility that his freedom may be curtailed.
1 79
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently held that a juvenile is entitled
to specific rights, which include notice of charges,1 80  legal
representation,18 confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, 
82
and the privilege against self-incrimination.183  At its inception, the
opinion cites to earlier cases where the Court ruled that basic notions of
due process and fundamental fairness must be satisfied in juvenile court
adjudications. 184 Specifically, the Court noted that "while these cases
relate only to restricted aspects of the subject, they unmistakably indicate
that.., neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
170. Id. at 5.
171. Id.
172. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 6.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 7.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 8.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 9-10. The juveniles asserted violations of their right to counsel, right to
confrontation and cross examination, right to the privilege against self incrimination and
right to receive notice of charges. Id.
179. Id. at 12.
180. Id. at 33.
181. Id. at41.
182. Id. at 56.
183. Id. at 55.
184. Id. at 12. The Court cites to its holding in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)
(where the Fourteenth Amendment applied to prohibit use of coerced confessions) and
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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adults alone.,
185
Although the Gault Court seemingly limits its decision to the
specific problems raised in that case, 186 it indisputably confirms the role
of due process in juvenile court,' 87 and discusses the precise impact that
these principles must have on juvenile proceedings.188 This article posits
that in doing so, the Court has effectively addressed the present day
concerns of an inherent conflict resulting from the states' use of
prosecutorial waiver.
First, in the process of granting due process protections, the Court
reiterates its opinion in Kent that one of the defined roles of the state and
its representatives is to function in accordance with the child's best
interest under the doctrine of parens patriae, and not as an adversary.' 89
Thus, the role of the state as standing in loco parentis, or in place of the
parent, is to take the child into its protection with the intent to make
decisions operating in the child's best interest. 90 The Court observes
that children were frequently denied certain procedural rights typically
available to adults based on the notion that children's rights were to
"custody," and not to "liberty."' 9' Up to the time that Gault was decided,
this discretionary latitude led to considerable arbitrariness in juvenile
proceedings.192  At least one author interprets the Gault Court's
extension of adult constitutional rights into juvenile court as "further
eviscerating the parens patriae philosophy."' 193  Instead, this article
contends that Gault is vital to understanding the necessary "marriage" of
constitutional protections universally enjoyed by adults with the
protective function of the prosecutor as mandated by the doctrine of
parens patriae.
With the "protective parent" as a steward, the juvenile court process
did not historically provide the delinquent child with the same procedural
protections as those afforded adults. 194 However, under the Gault facts,
185. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
186. Id.
187. Id. In referring to proceedings where a determination is made as to a juvenile's
misconduct and the consequence of incarceration, the court states, ".... there appears to
be little current dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role to
play." Id.
188. Id. at 21 n.26.
189. Id. at 16.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 17. See also Gordon, supra note 4, at 199. Procedural safeguards were
deemed unnecessary based on the "benevolent" characterization of the child's
relationship to the court. Id.
192. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19. See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
553 (1966).
193. Burns, supra note 36, at 343.
194. Gordon, supra note 4, at 198.
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the Court appears to criticize the juvenile court's "unbridled discretion"
when it effectively tramples on basic notions of fairness. The Court
states, "Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor
substitute for principle and procedure." 195  By analogy, this article
suggests that if the juvenile court judge's discretion in Gault is
constrained by due process principles, then the law must extend the same
protections when prosecutorial discretion amounts to a conflict in
representation of competing interests-namely, the juvenile's and
society's.
Hence, the Court delimited the protective function of the state and
its representatives by requiring that due process protections be
incorporated into juvenile adjudications. The role of the state as a child's
advocate remained intact. Where the juvenile court and its "actors"
historically utilized their protective purpose as a justification for relaxed
procedural protections, the Gault Court effectively halted the arbitrary
impact and prescribed, instead, the extension of due process that must
operate in concert with the foundationally protective doctrine of parens
patriae. Consequently, all juvenile court "actors," especially the
prosecutor, must function consistently with their commitment to the
marriage of these principles.
One might question whether, as a practical matter, the prosecutor's
function in juvenile cases still requires consideration of a child's best
interest when the doctrine of parens patriae is functionally archaic, at
best.196 This article suggests that, notwithstanding the societal response,
the historical goals upon which the juvenile court system was established
must still function today in concert with the doctrine of parens patriae.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Roper 197 "awakens" the sleeping
doctrine of parens patriae by reiterating some of the very same
observations regarding differences between adults and youth that
originally motivated the establishment of the juvenile court system.
With those observations in mind, the prosecutor's conflict in waiver
decisions not only violates due process protections afforded juveniles,
but also discredits the present day sentiment expressed by the U.S
Supreme Court in validating the continuation of the state's role as parens
patriae.
195. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18.
196. See Jonathan Simon, Law and the Postmodern Mind: Power Without Parents:
Juvenile Justice In a Postmodern Society, 16 CARDOzO L. REV. 1363, 1423-24 (1995).
197. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
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C. A Child is a Child: Roper, Parens Patriae and the Prosecutor
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Eighth Amendment protection to
juveniles under the age of eighteen from imposition of the death penalty
in Roper v. Simmons.198  This article will point out the particularly
heinous notion of an inherent conflict in prosecutorial waiver in light of
this recent opinion. The Court's reasoning in this landmark case
supports the need for the states to function in accordance with the child's
best interest as required under the doctrine of parens patriae. While the
Court does not specifically reference the doctrine, its opinion is based on
noted differences between juveniles and adults. 199  In addition, its
reasoning supports the attack on prosecutorial waiver methods for
transfer and treatment of juveniles in the adult system because the Court
does more than just set forth yet another constitutional limitation on the
states' power in juvenile adjudication.
In essence, Roper utilizes key established differences between
adults and juveniles that bear a striking resemblance to the foundational
basis for operation of the parens patriae doctrine in the juvenile court
system. For similar reasons, many states formulated juvenile court
systems over 100 years ago requiring adjudication of minors separate
from adults.200  This article contends that the state legislatures must,
therefore, reconsider any method of transfer, especially one that
generates an inherent conflict, in light of the Court's recognition of the
differences between adults and youth. By incorporating these differences
in its rationale for extending Eighth Amendment protections, the Court
further legitimizes the foundational basis for establishment of the
juvenile court system.
That is to say, if juveniles are afforded Eighth Amendment
protection from imposition of the death penalty because they
demonstrate less maturity and an overall diminished sense of
responsibility than adults,20' then a separate system for determining their
level of culpability is warranted. Because the doctrine of parens patriae
philosophically assumes key differences between juveniles and adults, a
waiver scheme that compromises the doctrine through the creation of an
inherent conflict with the prosecutor's discretionary role seems, at a
minimum, reprehensible.
Specifically, the Roper Court articulates three significant
differences between juveniles and adults to support its conclusion that
198. Id.
199. See Id. at 1195.
200. See Mack, supra note 30, at 107.
201. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195.
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juveniles cannot be considered the "worst offenders. 2 °2 First, the Court
notes scientific and sociological studies that confirm less maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility in juveniles.20 3 For these same
primary reasons, the states have historically justified their involvement
and responsibility in securing the well being of the delinquent child who
is presumably misguided and in need of protections that perhaps their
parents were unable to provide.20 4  Presently, the state still plays an
integral role in the juvenile adjudication process. Allowing the
prosecutor to serve both the child's best interest and society's creates an
inherent conflict and forces him to act contrary to his role as parens
patriae when considering factors like a child's maturity and
sophistication.
Furthermore, the Roper Court references the significant differences
between juveniles and adults as rationales used by the states for granting
various rights and privileges at civil law for those under the age of
eighteen such as voting and marriage without parental consent. 20 5 Views
on social maturity and judgment have been heralded by the states as
justification for separate classification and treatment of juveniles under
their jurisdictional law.20 6 The Court, therefore, exposes key differences
between juveniles and adults as a common viewpoint that is accepted by
the states for other purposes, albeit outside the criminal justice context.
Hypocritically, the states overlook those characteristics of juveniles that
make them uniquely suited for juvenile court adjudication and effectively
ignore the conflict involved with prosecutorial discretion in order to
expose juveniles to adult court prosecution.
Finally, the Court articulates additional differences between
juveniles and adults, including a greater vulnerability or susceptibility of
juveniles to negative peer pressure and less character development.20 7
This article suggests that these justifications cited by Roper presently
legitimize the state's protective role under the doctrine of parens patriae.
A conflict, therefore, should not be tolerated that compromises the
prosecutor's ability to fulfill that role. The states' motivation for
prosecutorial waiver is to impose harsher penalties and to seek
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Mack, supra note 30, at 107.
205. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195.
206. Gordon supra note 4, at 215-16. For example, Arizona has adopted age phasing
laws that permit juveniles varying benefits under its jurisdictional law once they reach a
minimum age. Id. Juveniles, therefore, cannot drive until 16 years of age nor vote,
purchase tobacco, get married or serve on a jury until reaching 18 years of age. Id. at
216. The author notes that the age phasing policies are premised upon legislators'
viewpoints as to a juvenile's cognitive and emotional maturity. Id.
207. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195.
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retribution for heinous crimes, 208 but Roper denounces these goals in the
context of the death penalty where retribution and deterrence are not as
strong motivators with minors as with adults. 0 9 Consequently, the
states' legislatively mandated discretion in the hands of the prosecutor
that conflicts with his role as parens patriae is misplaced.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court in Roper, children are truly
children to the point where imposition of the death penalty as
punishment for their criminal acts is unconstitutional. 210  This article
asserts, therefore, that we must preserve any "process" that regards a
delinquent child as a child. Furthermore, in the face of conflict, we must
abolish any "process" that treats him as an adult when the U.S. Supreme
Court has articulated constitutional grounds for juvenile protections
based on this distinction. Nevertheless, the use of prosecutorial
discretion in the states' waiver schemes challenges constitutional bounds
and the state courts' unwillingness to overstep them.
VI. Due Process Clause or Separation of Powers Doctrine Violation:
The State Court Response Does Not Insulate Conflicted Prosecutors
A. Prosecutorial Discretion Is Subject to Constitutional Constraint
Both federal and state courts have ruled that the prosecutor's
exercise of discretion is an executive office function that is necessary to
the administration of our criminal justice system. Therefore, review of
the prosecutor's charging decisions or consequences stemming from the
exercise of his executive functions seldom violate due process. 21' The
prosecutor, therefore, is granted broad discretion in fulfilling his role as
an "administrator of justice., 212 Brief examination of a U.S. Supreme
Court opinion analyzing prosecutorial discretion will lay the foundation
for this argument and the bases upon which this article refutes its use as
justification for prosecutorial waiver.
208. Wolf, supra note 50, at 283. Here, the author compares the goals of sentencing
in the adult system with present goals in various state juvenile justice systems and notes
that "retribution has become essential in juvenile justice, despite the intentions of those
who first developed the juvenile courts. As a result of this development, tension exists
between retribution and rehabilitation, and between social control and the juvenile's
welfare. In this battle, retribution and social control generally prevail." Id.
209. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1196.
210. See id.
211. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Hansen v.
State, 904 P.2d 811, 818 (Wyo. 1995); State v. Wooten, 543 S.E.2d 721-22 (Ga. 2001)
(where the Georgia Supreme Court held that the case assignment system which utilizes
prosecutorial discretion was not unconstitutional).
212. Wooten, 543 S.E.2d. at 723.
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In United States v. Armstrong,21 3 the court considers violation of the
Equal Protection Clause based on prosecutorial discretion under a
selective-prosecution claim. Although this case does not involve
juvenile adjudication, it sets forth the Court's more recent interpretation
of the constitutional constraint on prosecutorial discretion. Also, the
opinion is notable in establishing the universally understood functions
and motivations of the prosecutor. In Armstrong, the defendants were
charged with the sale of crack and use of firearms during a drug
trafficking scheme.214 Although the defendants alleged equal protection
violations, arguing that the Government acted with a discriminatory
purpose in prosecuting them, the Court ruled that the defendants failed to
establish that the Government declined to prosecute similarly situated
defendants of other races. 215 The court notes that the prosecutor has
historically been granted freedom to enforce the laws of either the Nation
or the states as a presidential delegate. In that capacity, he is charged
with fulfilling his constitutional responsibility as steward over the laws
of the states and the Nation.21 6 Accordingly, a prosecutor's discretion
remains checked only by the standard of probable cause.217
However, when the Court analyzes prosecutorial discretion, it
makes pertinent observations about the operation of this power by
stating, "[o]f course, a prosecutor's discretion is subject to constitutional
restraints.,21 8 This article posits that even the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in waiver cases must be appropriately measured against due
process and fairness principles. In this case, one of the constraints on the
prosecutor's discretion is imposition of the equal protection component
of the Due Process Clause in cases where the prosecutor's conduct
amounts to discriminatory acts. The court expressed that the
"administration of a criminal law" can be so improperly directed when
targeting specific classes of persons that the "system of prosecution"
219amounts to a violation of constitutional protections.  Consequently, the
Court suggests that those members of the executive branch that are
charged with the administration of justice in the criminal courts can
potentially develop methods as part of the system, like determining
whether or not to charge a defendant, that are constitutionally
impermissible.22 °
213. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
214. Id. at 458.
215. Id. at 476.
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Although the executive officer's functions must pass constitutional
scrutiny, the Court explains the presumed need for judicial deference to
the prosecutor's discretion.22' Specifically, the prosecutor is more
appropriately postured to weigh certain factors necessarily considered in
the administration of justice. Consideration of factors such as the
prosecution's general deterrence value and Government enforcement
priorities is inherent to the prosecutor's expected role in the criminal
system. 22 However, in the juvenile court system the child's best interest
dictates the prosecutor's representation. For the prosecutor who
represents the state under the doctrine of parens patriae, this means
serving fundamentally different goals than those inherent to his
traditional role.
In my opinion, the juvenile court prosecutor must "administer
justice" within the bounds of constitutional protections. The juveniles'
due process rights that are violated in the presence of the conflict must
restrain the traditional prosecutorial discretion. His function as an
executive official is not traditional in the juvenile court, but is
characterized instead by his representation as parens patriae. In
addition, the conflict arising from the prosecutor's dual function in
waiver cases is fundamentally unfair.
B. The States' Legislative Vigilantism Fails to Subvert the Conflict
Juvenile defendants have based their attack on prosecutorial
discretion in waiver cases on one or all of three constitutional grounds,
which include equal protection, due process and separation of powers. 23
It is generally understood that prosecutorial discretion is constrained by
discriminatory conduct under an equal protection clause analysis.
224
However, the state courts rely primarily on precedent under the Due
Process Clause and the separation of powers doctrine as justification for
use of prosecutorial discretion in their waiver schemes. 22 5 Unfortunately,
the state courts' analyses ignore the conflict that arises by granting sole
discretionary authority to a prosecutor serving dual functions as
representative of the state and as parens patriae.
Juvenile defendants assert violation of their due process rights when
221. Id.at 465.
222. Id.
223. See id. See also Manduley v. Super. Ct. of San Diego County, 41 P.3d 3 (Cal.
2002); Bishop v. State, 462 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1995).
224. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
225. See generally People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1982); State v. Cain, 381
So. 2d. 1361 (Fla. 1980); Bishop, 462 S.E.2d at 718; People v. Conat, 605 N.W.2d 49
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Jones v. State, 654 P.2d. 1080 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); Hansen
v. State, 904 P.2d. 811 (Wyo. 1995); Manduley, 41 P.3d at 19.
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the statute in question permits their transfer to an adult court subject only
to the prosecutor's discretion and absent a hearing. 226 In this instance,
the state legislature has granted authority to the prosecutor to make a
waiver decision without formally conducting a hearing to consider a
juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation in juvenile court.227 Similarly,
juvenile defendants assert violation of the separation of powers doctrine
arguing that the prosecutor's discretion ultimately dictates a juvenile's
disposition because his authority invades the exclusive power of the
judiciary to determine appropriate sentencing.228 In consideration of
these arguments, the Florida and California Supreme Courts in State v.
Cain229 and Manduley v. San Diego230 are unwilling to bypass their
respective state's legislative authority to enact laws that govern the
treatment of juveniles and the traditional role of the prosecutor in our
criminal justice system.
In Cain, juvenile defendants in two consolidated cases raised the
issue under Florida's waiver statute of whether the state attorney can
prosecute a sixteen-year-old juvenile as an adult when the juveniles had
committed two prior delinquent acts, one of which involved a felony.23I
The juveniles contended that the statute violated due process of law by
permitting the state attorney to pursue adult prosecution in the absence of
a hearing.2 32 The Florida Supreme Court denounced the juvenile
defendants' arguments under the Due Process Clause and the separation
of powers doctrine.23 3 First, the court decided that because of the
ambiguities associated with the constitutional ramifications of the Kent
opinion on statutes other than the D.C. statute in question, the juvenile
defendants in Cain improperly relied on their extension to the processes
226. In most instances, juveniles contest the absence of a hearing where consideration
of the Kent criteria allows for individualized assessment See discussion, supra note 152.
227. For example, in Florida, the prosecutor may exercise his discretion to file in
adult court in the absence of a waiver hearing. Instead, he is only required to develop
written policies and guidelines that are submitted to various government officials such as
the Governor. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.227(4) (West 2004).
228. Manduley, 41 P.3d at 12.
229. Cain, 381 So.2d. 1361.
230. Manduley, 41 P.3d 3.
231. Cain, 381 So.2d 1361. The statutory language in Cain granting prosecutorial
discretion was FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.04 (West 1978). See generally Sections 985.226(b)
and 985.227(2) for similar language where the state attorney may pursue adult
prosecution if public interests require adult sanction be imposed. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 985.226(b), 985.227(2) (West 2004).
232. Cain, 381 So.2d. at 1362.
233. See Cain, 381 So.2d 1361. Although the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the
transfer statutes did not violate due process by granting discretionary power to the
prosecutor to transfer without a hearing, the statutory scheme in 1980 treated all juveniles
the same and required a disposition hearing for determining appropriate sanctions.
Rosenbaum supra note 17, at 491.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
of prosecutorial decision-making.234 Second, the Florida Constitution
properly allows the legislature to decide treatment of juveniles under the
law.235 This includes the authority to empower the prosecutor with the
well-recognized discretion under the state's legislative transfer
scheme.236
More specifically, the court in Cain held that there is no common
law right to treatment as a juvenile as opposed to an adult.237 Since the
Florida Constitution granted legislative power to determine jurisdiction
over juvenile delinquents, exceptions for waiving juvenile court
jurisdiction are properly provided for by statute.238 The court further
adds that any exception to juvenile court jurisdiction that invokes
"traditional prosecutorial prerogative" of deciding who to charge, is
likewise within the province of the legislature. 239  The legislative
authority to consider transfer under Florida's scheme was deemed "far
from being arbitrary" but rather "entirely reasonable" because the
legislature can direct, via the grant of prosecutorial discretion, reasonable
consideration of "determinative factors" like those articulated in the Kent
Appendix.24 °
In my opinion, the Cain court is saying that since juveniles do not
have a judicially created right to juvenile court and because the state
constitution has delegated authority to the legislature to enact laws that
govern treatment of juveniles, the statutory scheme granting
prosecutorial discretion is proper. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the absence of a common law right, it also afforded juveniles
specific constitutional rights that comport with basic notions of due
process and fundamental fairness.24' Perhaps even more crucial is the
Cain court's conclusion that, notwithstanding any constitutional
ramifications of the Kent opinion, the Florida State Legislature can
permissibly grant discretion to a prosecutor rather than to a judge to
transfer a juvenile into adult court.242 The court states the following:
The decision (Kent) is, of course, harmonious with our tradition that
judicial proceedings involving substantial rights of an alleged
criminal shall be attended by the full panoply of due process. But,
we do not here confront judicial proceedings. Rather, we have
234. Cain, 381 So. 2d. at 1366.
235. Id. at 1363.
236. Id. at 1364.
237. Id. at 1363.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1364. See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).
241. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
242. Cain. 381 So. 2d. at 1365.
[Vol. 110:2
2005] PROSECUTORIAL WAIVER INTO ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 273
simply a traditional exercise of discretion within the executive
branch... we cannot equate the prosecutorial decision with judicial
proceedings absent legislative direction.
243
Thus, on one hand, the Florida Supreme Court is willing to acknowledge
the protection of due process rights that are afforded juveniles by the
U.S. Supreme Court, but yet it is unwilling to override the authority of
the state legislature in its lawmaking capacity to promulgate laws that
circumvent those constitutionally protected rights. One should question,
therefore, whether the Florida courts would rule consistent with their
opinion in Cain when confronted with the argument posited by this
article that asserts an unconstitutional violation of juveniles' due process
rights when a prosecutor's discretion generates a conflict of interest.
After all, the legislature grants the authority based on the motivation
of its constituents (e.g., society) and the well-recognized role of the
traditional prosecutor who is expected to serve society's interest. Even
though there may not appear to be any problem with legislative
consideration, via prosecutorial discretion, of the Kent determinative
factors,244 the prosecutor who may be charged by the state to weigh these
factors cannot fairly do so when operating under competing interests.
Protection of juvenile due process rights in a process that comports with
fairness and freedom from conflict is essential to the criminal justice
system, as recognized by the Kent2 45 and Gault246 courts. Therefore, the
state courts must further the interpretation made by the U.S. Supreme
Court when applying these principles to the laws of the state. It is not an
issue of an absolute right to treatment in juvenile court. But, in order to
protect juveniles from conflicting interests that violate their due process
rights, the states' high courts must herald these protections above
legislative enactments.
Furthermore, the juvenile defendants in Cain relied on Kent to
support the argument that procedural due process should be afforded to
them when there is threat of "substantial loss as a result of governmental
action., 247 The Cain court distinguished the judicial proceeding in Kent
from the traditional processes of a prosecutor whose discretion is
inherent to our criminal justice system, and therefore absolute.248 If the
prosecutor exercises that discretion, the juvenile still receives many of
the same advantages in adult court that he would receive as a juvenile
delinquent. Therefore, he suffers no "abandonment of rehabilitative
243. Id. at 1366.
244. Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67.
245. Id. at 541.
246. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
247. Cain, 381 So. 2d at 1365.
248. Id. at 1364.
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efforts. 249 Unfortunately, in light of the "Get Tough" era that drives
enactment of prosecutorial waiver schemes, the court's observation does
not pertain to today's world where prosecution as an adult means
imposition of adult penalties sans rehabilitative concerns.250 The "loss"
suffered is, therefore, substantial and, when effectuated by an inherent
conflict, is unconstitutional.
In addition, the Supreme Court of California in Manduley v. San
Diego,251 recently addressed constitutional challenges made by juvenile
defendants asserting violation of the separation of powers doctrine when
the state amended its transfer statute to broaden the circumstances under
which prosecutors may exercise discretion.252 The arguments asserted by
juvenile defendants, and, correspondingly, the court's analysis in
response fails in primarily two related areas. First and foremost,
arguments asserting violation of the separation of powers doctrine ignore
the due process rights violation that arises when the prosecutor serves
competing interests. The constitutional protection against conflict of
interests is so fundamental to the juvenile adjudication process that it
supersedes any justification for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
under the separation of powers doctrine.
Furthermore, the court's justification for prosecutorial discretion
under the doctrine points to the very conflict of interests that violate
juveniles' due process rights. In Manduley, the prosecutor directly filed
various felony charges in criminal court under Section 707(d) of the
California Welfare and Institutions Code against eight minors. 3  The
juvenile defendants challenged the constitutionality of Section 707(d)
based on several grounds; however, the violation asserted under the
separation of powers doctrine specifically addressed the prosecutor's
discretionary authority to file charges in the juvenile or criminal
divisions of the superior court. 4  The juveniles asserted two basic
249. Id. at 1367.
250. See discussion, supra Part III.A.
251. See Manduley, 41 P. 3d at 3.
252. Id. at 14.
253. Id. at 8. This section broadened the circumstances in which prosecutors are
authorized to file charges in cases (1) where a minor 16 years of age or older is accused
of committing one of several enumerated offenses of a violent or serious nature,
(2) where a 16 year old is accused of specified offenses and has been previously
adjudicated as a ward of the state on a felony offense when he was 14 years of age or
older, or (3) where a minor 14 years of age or older is accused of committing certain
serious offenses under specified circumstances. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707(d)(l)-
(3) (West 2004); California recently amended § 707 to add "rape of an unconscious
person" to a list of 30 enumerated offenses that subject children 16 years of age or older
to adult prosecution. 2005 California Assembly Bill No. 743, California 2005-06
Regular Session, amended April 20, 2005.
254. Manduley, 41 P. 3d at 9. The juveniles also asserted violation of their due
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arguments under the doctrine. First, the prosecutor as an executive
branch official is vested with authority that usurps the judiciary's
exclusive authority to determine individualized sentencing schemes.
255
Second, the legislative branch granted the executive branch, or the
prosecutor, with exclusively judicial functions that influence appropriate
dispositions for convicted minors.25 6
The California Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's exercise of
discretion under Section 707(d) was within the scope of the executive
power and did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.25 7 The court
based its opinion on two basic points. First, the exercise of the
prosecutor's discretion occurred before invoking jurisdiction and prior to
initiating judicial proceedings.2 58 Second, the broad scope of the
prosecutor's power is permissibly rooted in the principle of separation of
powers, and any consequences that may result, such as effects on
sentencing alternatives, do not usurp judicial function.25 9
The Manduley 26  court's distinction between the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion before initiating judicial proceedings and
invoking jurisdiction is a temporal distinction that is clearly made
without substance, particularly if one views the prosecutor's decision as
a violation of constitutionally protected rights to freedom from conflict.
Certainly, the distinction made by the court properly refers to the
mechanics of a charging decision and the forum for charging being made
prior to the official exercise of judicial functions. However, such
mechanics do not obviate the "full panoply of due process 2 61 that should
be afforded any criminal defendant, much less juvenile defendants.
Ultimately, the protections articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court must
govern over the laws of the states.262
process rights because the statute does not allow for a fitness hearing to determine
amenability to rehabilitate in juvenile court, violation of the equal protection laws
because two classes of minors charged with the same crime can be treated differently,
violation of protections against cruel and unusual punishment because the minors are
placed in adult prisons, and violation of the "single-subject" rule under the California
constitution because Proposition 21 that amended Section 707 addressed distinct and
unrelated subjects.
255. Id. at 12.
256. Id. at 13.
257. Id. at 20.
258. Id. at 12-14.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Cain, 381 So. 2d. at 1366.
262. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (where the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the conflicting powers of a state's sovereignty and the laws of
the Union or federal government holding that Maryland tax legislation is void and
contrary to the U.S. Constitution because it places a tax on the operations of the federal
bank, and therefore, unconstitutionally taxes the powers of the federal government to
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Furthermore, in describing the broad nature of the prosecutor's
power to decide whom to charge and in what forum, the court frames
these decisions as "among those designated by statute. 263 Therefore, the
prosecutor, as an executive branch official, has discretion to act
according to the perimeters set forth by the legislature. This affirms the
delegation of authority under the separation of powers doctrine. Even so,
it is not a question of the prosecutor's traditional role in deciding the
forum or selecting the charge that is problematic. Acting under this role
may be appropriate for adult criminal prosecution, but it is not for
juvenile adjudication when the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion to
waive juvenile court jurisdiction redefines his traditional role. Instead,
he is expected to represent the state's interest in promoting rehabilitation.
The long-standing prosecutorial function is not exclusive to
representation of society's interest. His function in the context of
juvenile waiver cases must also be viewed as his representation of the
child's best interest under the doctrine ofparens patriae.
The state courts must view the legislative authority in light of the
conflict that it creates. Of course, the state legislature recognizes the
prosecutor's allegiance to do justice and seek retribution on behalf of
society and that he represents the democratic voice of the people. 26 In
fact, both the Cain and Manduley courts acknowledge the
interrelationship between the public interest, the prosecutor's discretion,
and the legislature's power as a voice of the people. In Cain, the court
refers to the Florida transfer statute "calling" the prosecutor to exercise
discretion "in the public interest" as, "a truism, for that obligation is
already ascribed to him., 265  Additionally, in Manduley, the public
interest comes to life when, "the power of the people through the
execute its federal legislation. In that case, the State of Maryland passed legislation that
imposed a tax on, "... . all Banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not
chartered by the legislature." Congress had enacted federal legislation two years before
that incorporated a Bank of the United States that maintained branches in various states).
263. Manduley, 41 P. 3d at 12.
264. Wooten, 543 S.E.2d. at 723. The court states, "In our criminal justice system,
the district attorney represents the people of the state in prosecuting individuals who have
been charged with violating our state's criminal laws. The responsibility of the public
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely
to convict. This special duty exists because the prosecutor represents the sovereign...
[t]herefore, the district attorney is more than an advocate for one party and has additional
professional responsibilities ... to make decisions in the public's interest." The Georgia
Supreme Court's description of the prosecutor is important for several reasons. First, it
substantiates the fact that the prosecutor represents society's interest in prosecuting
wrongdoers. The court explains the prosecutor's contribution to the process of
prosecution as a function that operates beyond just "advocating" one's position. But, this
presumes that we first accept his role as one who advocates one side's interest, which is
the states'.
265. Cain, 381 So. 2d. at 1368.
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statutory initiative is coextensive with the power of the legislature. 266
Since the state courts already recognize the prescribed role of the
prosecutor as representing societal interests, once the conflict is
identified, sufficient grounds for constitutional attack on use of the
prosecutor's sole discretion in waiver cases exist. On the other hand, if
the conflict persists, we might soon see the erosion of the very principles
upon which the juvenile court system was founded. The conflict, in and
of itself, represents the catalyst for this erosion that ultimately serves as
one of the greatest harms of prosecutorial waiver.
VII. The Conflict Erodes the Juvenile Court System
Generally, the dangers associated with transfer of juveniles into
adult court and the consequences that result, have been vastly
267identified. A continued conflict, however, that permeates the process
for juvenile transfer into adult court presents its own set of dangers.
Since state law governs transfer, an examination of the states' ethical
opinions that identify problems associated with conflict of interest is
appropriate. As stated earlier, the relationship between the delinquent
child and the prosecutor as parens patriae is unique.2 68 Consequently,
266. Manduley, 41 P. 3d at 13.
267. The most significant impacts of juvenile transfer are realized, generally, in the
following 3 areas: (1) inadequate resources in adult prison, (2) victimization of child
inmates, and (3) increased recidivism rates. Ellie D. Shefi, Note, Waiving Goodbye:
Incarcerating Waived Juveniles in Adult Correctional Facilities Will Not Reduce Crime,
36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 653, 663-65 (2003). Because children are not like adults,
despite the "mature" nature of the crimes that they commit, they possess special needs in
handling matters throughout incarceration in adult prisons. Frequently, the states lack
resources to offer treatment and counseling services that can address these special needs.
Id. at 664. As stated earlier, if children who commit crimes have different level of
maturity and psychological development, then funding is necessary to offer counseling,
education and resources specifically geared toward their needs. In reality, children in
adult prisons become victims of physical and sexual assault committed by adult inmates.
Child inmates subsequently develop additional emotional problems leading to an increase
in suicide attempts. Id. But, even more pertinent to the issue of juvenile transfer into
adult courts is the increased rate of juvenile recidivism. Remember, retribution and
deterrence drive the "Get Tough" movement that constructed prosecutorial waiver.
Studies have shown, however, that juveniles who have served in adult prisons are more
likely to re-offend than their counterparts in adult prison who committed comparable
crimes. Jarod K. Hofacket, Comment: Justice or Vengeance: How Young is Too Young
For A Child To Be Tried And Punished As An Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 159, 165-
166 (2002). Indubitably, young offenders in adult prisons are being taught by adult
offenders to become "better criminals". In effect, adult prisons become "schools for
crime." Christina Dejong and Eve Schwitzer Merrill, Getting "Tough On Crime":
Juvenile Waiver and the Criminal Court, 27 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 175-76 (2001). This is
not so surprising if one recognizes who serves as the available "role models" for children
in adult prisons.
268. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 60 (Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, disagrees
with the majority in providing Bill of Rights safeguards in juvenile court because it
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when describing the prosecutor's role in the juvenile court, his
''representation" of the child's best interest does not denote the
traditional attorney-client relationship in every sense. The same is true
for his "representation" of society's interest. Nevertheless, concepts like
impartiality and the appearance of impropriety convey the spirit of the
law that directs the conduct of attorneys in an adversarial system.269
Fairness is the goal. 270 And, fairness signals due process of law.
Accordingly, one danger of continued conflict occurs when the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion means the destruction of impartiality.
In People v. Conner, the California Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of a trial court judge to disqualify a district attorney from participation in
prosecution of a defendant when a conflict of interest, "... . might
prejudice him against the accused and thereby affect, or appear to affect,
his ability to impartially perform the discretionary function of his
office. 271
Under discretionary waiver, the prosecutorial conflict occurs
because the prosecutor represents the "voice" of society and the best
interest of the juvenile. As a result, his dual representation under the
juvenile and adult systems manifests a conflict that prejudices him
against the juvenile's interest. Under Conner, a conflict of interest
prejudiced a prosecutor and impeded his ability to be impartial, 27 and
impartiality is a myth if one recognizes the realities of the unspoken
pressure placed upon the prosecutor as an elected official 273 to meet the
conflicts with the social policy that labels juvenile court proceedings as civil in nature.
For Justice Black, the "unique" aspects of the juvenile court were tied to the procedural
informalities that distinguish criminal from civil proceedings).
269. In Re Advisory Opinion of Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 847 S.W. 2d 723 (1993); People
v. Conner, 666 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1983).
270. State v. Tate, 925 S.W. 2d 548 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The court recognizes
the importance of fair treatment under the law as it relates to ethical standards that govern
an attorney's conduct when it states, "The perception of a fair trial is just as important as
the reality." Id. at 558.
271. Conner, 666 P.2d at 8. In this case, the Santa Clara County District Attorney's
office challenged an order of recusal for the entire office when one of their deputy district
attorney's became a witness and, arguably, a victim at the hands of the defendant that he
was prosecuting. Id at 7.
272. Id. at 8.
273. Gordon, supra note 4, at 221-23. The fear of partiality exhibited by a prosecutor
deciding waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction surfaces when one recognizes the
allegiance that he possesses to his role as an advocate for the state. The pressure arises
because it is the public's approval that determines his future election. The threat of
partiality is heightened when the avenue for adult prosecution is made available by the
state legislature with the specific purpose in mind to meet the public's expectation for
harsher treatment against juvenile offenders. In practice, this means that a prosecutor is,
"more likely to seek transfer of jurisdiction in response to society's demand for
retribution ... and less likely ... to consider the welfare of the accused." Id. at 223
(quoting Barry C. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The
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expectation of his constituents (e.g., society). If the prosecutor cannot be
impartial in the exercise of discretion, then he disserves his role as
parens patriae and as society's administrator of justice.
In addition to the destruction of impartiality, the appearance of
impropriety indicated by the prosecutor's conflicting roles erodes the
juvenile court system when his conduct compromises public confidence
in the integrity of our criminal justice system.2 74 In Tate, the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals held that an actual conflict of interest and
appearance of impropriety were established when an attorney, who
presided as a judge by signing grand jury indictments against the
defendant and who participated in pretrial proceedings, was later
appointed to a position as District Attorney General for Knox County.275
In its reasoning, the court refers to the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 9, Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety, by
stating that the Canon, "should be strictly construed .. and no practice
must be permitted which invites doubt or distrust of the integrity in our
law,.., and in the administration of justice. 276
The erosion in our juvenile court occurs when we place no concern
over the prosecutor's role as parens patriae and the integrity necessarily
required in the administration of his role in the criminal adjudication of
our children.277 This article asserts that the prosecutor must, at a
minimum, exude trust if we purport to have a separate system for
treatment of delinquent children. He cannot do so if he also acts as a
representative of the state's interest in ascribing guilt during the criminal
adjudication process. In effect, the states' use of discretionary
prosecutorial waiver contributes to the erosion of the juvenile court
system as long as the continued conflict tramples on juveniles' protection
against unfair treatment. A separate criminal system for juveniles will
eventually fail the delinquent child when it is clear that the prosecutor
cannot serve two masters.278
VIII. Conclusion
Children become juveniles at the point where immaturity meets
with poor judgment. Somewhere along the way, a child participates in a
series of acts that may mistakenly result in commission of a crime.
Several factors potentially contribute to a child's lack of judgment,
Legislative Alternative to Asking Answerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 516
(1978)).
274. Tate, 925 S.W. 2d at 555.
275. Id, at 554, 555.
276. Id. at 551.
277. Id. at 555.
278. Sabo, supra note 34, at 2451.
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including the notion that a child seldom makes a rational decision to
actively commit a crime. For instance, the public likely questioned the
rational capabilities of Nathaniel Brazill, a thirteen-year-old who, after
shooting his middle school teacher, Barry Grunow, responded to his
classmate by stating, "[w]atch. I'm going to be all over the news. 27 9
Nevertheless, when the child commits a crime, it is incumbent upon
society to address the problem. Are punitive measures warranted in
some instances? Most of us will agree that a form of sanction is
appropriate. After all, by not sanctioning the conduct, society fails our
children through evasive disregard for immoral conduct. But, at what
point does society fulfill its obligation to address children's malfeasance
without constructively abandoning them and the compelling
circumstances surrounding commission of their crimes? This article
suggest that although a child who commits a crime may acquire physical
characteristics that make him appear to act as an adult, studies280 have
shown, and the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized,2 1 that there is more
to consider than merely what society sees.
If a child commits a crime, therefore, society must delve into the
individual factors that contributed to the criminal conduct. Discretionary
prosecutorial waiver supplants the juvenile court system processes that
were historically designed to treat each child individually like a child.
The prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system has traditionally
embodied society's interest in seeking justice, but when society seeks
justice against a child who commits alleged criminal acts, we have
historically chosen to transfigure "justice" into rehabilitation. If a child
committed a crime, then we did not treat him as our adult counterpart
who chose to do harm and deserved punishment as a consequence.
Instead, we built a separate system around an opposing philosophy to the
societal norm of punishment for adult offenders.
Hence, when the prosecutor's role extends into the juvenile justice
system, it becomes re-characterized under the parens patriae doctrine
that embraces rehabilitation of the delinquent child. Even further, a
conflict arises when we position the prosecutor to utilize his sole
discretion in choosing punishment in the adult system, as a priority over
providing the juvenile with treatment. Opposing sides are formulated
where society's punitive agenda, as implemented by the prosecutor, no
longer works in concert with the juvenile's best interest. The resulting
conflict tramples on notions of fair treatment under the law afforded to
all persons under any system of criminal adjudication.
279. Brazill, 845 So. 2d at 285.
280. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1183.
281. Id.
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Ultimately, public sentiment that advocates punishment over
rehabilitation may diminish the differences between adults and youth.
Regardless, the presence of the conflict is ample basis for respite.
Ignoring the conflict sets forth the belief that representation of a
juvenile's interest is not the same as representation of an adult's interest
in our criminal justice system. Therefore, we effectively erase the basic
premise of the adversarial system that two opposing sides must be fairly
represented in order to seek truth and justice.
The state legislatures have abused the prosecutor's traditional
function as an executive official in our criminal justice system to serve
its punitive agenda. Perhaps, punishment is occasionally warranted
when children who commit serious crimes need to suffer harsh
consequences. However, we do not address the issue by creating a
conflict that compromises the integrity of the prosecutor's office and his
function under both the adult and juvenile systems.
While the differences between adults and youth were considerable
enough to justify affording juveniles Eighth Amendment protection
282
from the death penalty, perhaps, at a minimum, these differences will
encourage the state legislatures and their courts to contemplate the
unconstitutionally impermissible endowment of prosecutorial discretion
for transfer of juveniles into adult court.
282. Id.

